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Corporate Social Responsibility
in a Remedy-Seeking Society:
A Public Choice Perspective
Donald J. Kochan*
ABSTRACT
This Article applies the lessons of public choice theory to examine
corporate social responsibility. The Article adopts a broad definition of corporate
social responsibility activism to include both (1) those efforts that seek to
convince corporations to voluntarily take into account corporate social
responsibility in their own decision-making, and (2) the efforts to alter the legal
landscape and expand legal obligations of corporations beyond traditional
notions of harm and duty so as to force corporations to invest in interests other
than shareholders and profits because they must comply with these new laws.
After surveying the corporate social responsibility debate, this Article
examines public interest-labeled groups (including corporate social
responsibility groups) under a public choice lens and determines that they seek
to maximize their budgets, maximize influence, maximize membership, secure
their jobs, and in the case of corporate social responsibility sometimes directly
effectuate wealth transfers into their organizations or constituencies (e.g., from
shareholders to stakeholders). When rent-seeking for legal change is the more
efficient use of corporate social responsibility advocates’ limited resources, those
groups will invest in the creation of law.
This Article pays special attention to a broad definition of rent-seeking
that includes the investments made, through precedent-building litigation
models, in the creation of legal liability regimes or realistic new threats of legal
liability in an effort to obtain leverage over corporations in settlements or other
negotiations designed to convince corporations to change behavior. According to
studies on settlement dynamics, when novel new litigation theories start to
survive motions to dismiss, corporate defendants have more incentives to settle
to avoid harm to reputation or brand, in addition to avoiding adverse
judgments. The Article concludes using the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) as a case
study illustrating how the interest-group dynamic can play out in the
development of a corporate social responsibility-driven liability regime.

* Professor of Law, Chapman University Dale E. Fowler School of Law. I am
grateful for valuable research assistance from William Kelly, comments from Dean Tom
Campbell, and the comments and support of Jennifer Spinella.
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INTRODUCTION
Advocates for some corporate “socially responsible” role and
the imposition of some duties upon corporate boards greater than
maximizing wealth often cast themselves as society’s champions
for the greater public interest or public good. This is too simple a
story. A primary goal of this Article will be to demonstrate that
corporate social responsibility (CSR) advocates are interest
groups too. Thus, law and economics can teach us a bit about the
behaviors we can expect from corporate social responsibility
advocates, depending on the available legal architecture which
can be deployed to advance the advocates’ interests and
preferences in an effort to gain leverage against their
adversaries—the profit-seeking corporations. Corporate social
responsibility advocates will engage in rent-seeking behavior,
investing in legal outcomes when it is beneficial to their cause.
Thus, how the law of corporate social responsibility is shaped and
how advocates operate to shape the law can each be explained in
part by reference to interest-group behaviors and public choice
theory. While corporate social responsibility reverberates with
sounds of the wonderful, it has rent-seeking undertones like any
other effort to use the law to shape social policy through controls
on private behavior.
After centuries of academics weighing in on the debate over
corporate social responsibility, there exists almost a required
four-part checklist of introductory disclaimers in any article that
will soon ink yet more pages on the already swollen corporate
social responsibility bookshelf. There are, at least, some
predictable, seemingly obligatory categories of observation in
most article introductions and I will provide my due compliance
before proceeding.
First, an author should acknowledge that they are
cautiously, indeed nervously and with some hesitation, entering
a field already well tread. Professor Cynthia Williams, for
example, in one of her lengthy explorations of corporate social
responsibility stated that “[i]t is with some trepidation that this
author undertakes a rather extended venture into the contested
arena of corporate social responsibility.”1 I hereby incorporate
that statement and thereby check off the first box on the list.
Second, the author should alert readers that the academic
material on corporate social responsibility is massive and
overwhelming and acknowledge that it is hard to imagine why

1 Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of Economic
Globalization, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 705, 706 (2002).
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someone would want to read yet another article in this seemingly
saturated area of law, economics, and public policy. Professors
Henry Butler and Fred McChesney captured this sentiment well
when they exclaimed while writing on corporate social
responsibility that “[f]or centuries legal, political, social, and
economic commentators have debated corporate social
responsibility ad nauseam.”2
Third, it is obligatory to mention something about the
definition of corporate social responsibility. Quite frequently this
will involve some explanation that there is no one, definitive
definition of corporate social responsibility, and this cautionary
note will sometimes include a statement that the author will not
attempt a singular definition. Usually it will also follow with
some statement that the author will focus on one or more
particular meanings of the phrase captured within the broader
concept of corporate social responsibility. Consider Professor
Peter Madsen’s comment in the opening to an article that
“[d]efining CSR is, as the saying goes, like trying to nail Jell-O to
the wall.”3 Or, as Williams explains as another example, “[o]ver
the past decades . . . it has been difficult to define what one
means, in any fully specified way, by the concept of corporate
social responsibility, and thus it has been difficult to discuss
except at a high level of generality.”4 There is no doubt that
corporate social responsibility is tough to define and means
different things to different people. As this Article proceeds, I will
attempt to make clear the meaning of the phrase as I intend to
use it when possible or helpful, but I will also write with some of
the necessary generalities.5
In this Article, I will be defining corporate social
responsibility activism broadly as related to both (1) those efforts
that seek to convince corporations to voluntarily take into
account corporate social responsibility in their own
decision-making, willingly launch corporate initiatives based on
concerns beyond profit, and sometimes specifically and
intentionally address social and stakeholder values; and (2) the
efforts to alter the legal landscape and expand legal obligations of
corporations beyond traditional notions of harm and duty so as to
2 Henry N. Butler & Fred S. McChesney, Why They Give at the Office: Shareholder
Welfare and Corporate Philanthropy in the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 84
CORNELL L. REV. 1195, 1195 (1999).
3 Peter Madsen, Professionals, Business Practitioners, and Prudential Justice, 39
MCGEORGE L. REV. 835, 836 (2008).
4 Williams, supra note 1, at 775.
5 David Millon, Shareholder Social Responsibility, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 911, 919
(2013) (“There is no single, generally accepted definition of CSR,” but “it is possible to
sketch the concept’s meaning in broad outlines.”).
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force corporations to invest in interests other than shareholders
and profits because it must comply with these new laws.
Throughout this Article, I will also use terms like activism,
advocacy, and expansionism interchangeably to capture the
nature of those interest groups that seek to engraft new social
welfare-oriented obligations, and impose higher standards, on
corporations. These interest groups see businesses as their
opposition or competition.
Finally, within the four obligatory components of a corporate
social responsibility article introduction, the author should make
some claim that there is something new and unique in the article
at hand that makes it worthy of some attention. This is
particularly important because the corporate social responsibility
field is already so substantially plowed. Sometimes, the claim
will be about something truly new. At other times, the author
might need to admit that the work is partly new just in the sense
that this particular author has never said it before and not yet
thrown his perspective into the mix. Professor Stephen
Bainbridge provided an insight on this phenomena when he
observed in an article focused on corporate social responsibility
that, usually, every current corporate social responsibility
“debate is not being driven by any crisis in corporate law,”6 but
instead “[i]t is just a perennial problem on which each new
generation of corporate law scholars feels obliged to put its
stamp.”7
While there will be a bit of that “first time in print by my
pen” newness in this article and some articulations will be made
for the first time by this author, yet not the first time such ideas
have ever been uttered, my aim is to provide a few insights that
have not yet been articulated in the literature with any sense of
clarity. Principal among these will be why it is useful to look at
corporate social responsibility advocates as classic interest
groups seeking to obtain wealth transfers that they would be
incapable of receiving absent their manipulation of the legal
process to achieve changes in legal doctrine in order to obtain
advantage in advancing their goals. In particular, this Article
will focus on the investments corporate social responsibility
advocates make in the creation of legal liability regimes or
realistic new threats of legal liability in an effort to obtain

6 Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm:
A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423, 1435 n.40 (1993) [hereinafter
Bainbridge, In Defense].
7 Id. Bainbridge followed this claim directly with the statement, “[h]erewith my
spin.” Id.
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leverage over corporations in settlements or other negotiations
designed to convince corporations to change behavior.
Part I will survey the corporate social responsibility debate,
briefly describing the spectrum along which the arguments
regarding wealth-maximization and other more expansive social
responsibilities exist. Part I will conclude with an introduction to
the means by which law can provide benefits to those seeking
acceptance for greater, more expansive notions of corporate social
responsibility. Part II will introduce public choice and
interest-group theory. It will explain the process of rent-seeking
for legal advantage and explain why corporate social
responsibility activists should be received with the skepticism
afforded all interest groups in the political process. It will
conclude that, like other interest groups, corporate social
responsibility activists try to use the law to obtain advantages for
their cause at a lower cost than they could obtain these benefits
by bargaining for these things in the open marketplace. The law
and economics literature does not discuss often enough the
separate public choice and rent-seeking phenomena distinctively
seen in the development of liabilities through litigation.8 Part II
will also discuss this process of rent-seeking as being broader
than the pursuit of legislation. Any concept of rent-seeking
should include interest group investment in changing the law to
create liability regimes that benefit the group (here, corporate
social responsibility advocates) and expand the duties and
compensatory obligations
of
their
competitors
(here,
corporations).
Despite the fact that the literature is saturated with articles
on almost every aspect of corporate social responsibility, there is
surprisingly little attention paid to the interest group dynamics
in the contest between corporations and advocates for a more
expansive type of corporate social responsibility above and
beyond what might occur as a natural consequence of seeking
wealth-maximization. Although there are a number of examples
of rent-seeking behaviors by corporate social responsibility
advocates that could be discussed, given the limited space for this
symposium article, Part III will examine only one type of
behavior with one case study—liability-seeking efforts under the
Alien Tort Statute (ATS).9 The ATS provides a recent example
where we saw the interest-group dynamic play out in the
8 Paul H. Rubin, Christopher Curran & John F. Curran, Litigation Versus
Legislation: Forum Shopping by Rent Seekers, 107 PUB. CHOICE 295, 295–96 (2001)
(discussing the relatively fewer works devoted to public choice implications in litigation
for rent-seeking ends vis-à-vis the number of similar analyses of legislative processes).
9 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
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development of a liability regime for human rights and other
international law abuses. Part III examines the evolution of the
ATS as a liability-imposing corporate social responsibility tool.
The corporate social responsibility advocates’ investment in the
development of an ATS liability doctrine (for a time with some
substantial success) will demonstrate how interest groups
operate in what might be called “rent-seeking” through judicially
based “remedy-seeking” behavior.
In the end, through general analysis and the ATS case study,
this Article seeks to unveil the public interest curtain that often
shields corporate social responsibility activists from the scrutiny
their efforts should receive. When it comes to corporations, a
remedy-seeking society is often too quick to presume that more
socially desirable outcomes require restraining corporate
shareholder wealth. At the very least, it should be understood
that any efforts to do so will advantage another self-interested
group rather than somehow serving primarily the true public
interest.
I. THE CONTOURS OF THE CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY DEBATE
A. A Ubiquitous Contest Between Two Competing Visions of
Responsibility and Duty
Corporate social responsibility has no single, accepted
definition, yet it stirs the passions of many behind their own
conception of the term.10 As a result, issues regarding the social
responsibility of corporations—including whether there are any
such obligations at all—have generated substantial debate over
the years.11
Within the debate over the scope of corporate social
responsibility there are two poles with varying positions in
between.12 On one side of the spectrum are those who believe
that corporations have social responsibilities of some kind or
degree beyond the bottom line and beyond compliance with
existing laws. The opposite side of the spectrum believes that the
social responsibility of corporations cannot be judged outside of
the obligation of a corporation to achieve wealth-maximization in
the corporate management’s fiduciary duties to its shareholders

Williams, supra note 1, at 775.
Millon, supra note 5, at 921 (“Given the lack of an agreed definition of CSR, it
comes as no surprise that there are several different models or theories of CSR.”).
12 Williams, supra note 1, at 711–20 (summarizing the corporate social responsibility
literature and the varying legal and policy positions).
10
11
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or obligations in compliance with its web of contracts. Of course,
nuanced definitional issues and middle ground positions appear
within the discussion as well—including questions regarding
what counts as “law,” what is our definition of “duty” and “harm,”
and what is the meaning of “wealth-” or “profit-maximization.”
This section will briefly discuss the presence and growth of the
debate within corporate law followed by a brief discussion of the
substantive claims behind the wealth-maximization theories
juxtaposed with the more expansive theories of corporate social
responsibility.
While it is true that this is an age-old debate,13 there is no
doubt that the issue of corporate social responsibility—especially
the rise of camps arguing for an enlarged sense of corporate duty
to social interests and stakeholders outside of the corporate
form—has received steadily increasing attention across the past
several decades. One insight into this evolution of the corporate
social responsibility conversation can be gleaned from a survey of
the use of the phrase “corporate social responsibility” across time.
For that task, I will turn briefly to the results from Google’s
Ngram function14—which has been described as “the first tool of
its kind, capable of precisely and rapidly quantifying cultural
trends based on massive quantities of data. It is a gateway to
culturomics!”15 This unique Google product enables users “to
examine the frequency of words . . . or phrases . . . in books over
time.”16 The database permits searching “through over 5.2
million books: ~4% of all books ever published!”17 The creators
proclaim that this tool will have “profound consequences for the
study of language, lexicography, and grammar.”18 The Ngram

Butler & McChesney, supra note 2, at 1195.
GOOGLE BOOKS NGRAM VIEWER, http://books.google.com/ngrams (last visited Oct.
4, 2013) [hereinafter Google Labs Ngram Viewer] (based on the model and database
developed by Jean-Baptiste Michel, Yuan Kui Shen, Aviva Presser Aiden, Adrian Veres,
Matthew K. Gray, William Brockman, The Google Books Team, Joseph P. Pickett, Dale
Hoiberg, Dan Clancy, Peter Norvig, Jon Orwant, Steven Pinker, Martin A. Nowak, and
Erez Lieberman Aiden. See Jean-Baptiste Michel, Yuan Kui Shen, Aviva Presser Aiden,
Adrian Veres, Matthew K. Gray, William Brockman, The Google Books Team, Joseph P.
Pickett, Dale Hoiberg, Dan Clancy, Peter Norvig, Jon Orwant, Steven Pinker, Martin A.
Nowak, & Erez Lieberman Aiden, Quantitative Analysis of Culture Using Millions of
Digitized Books, SCIENCE, Jan. 14, 2011, at 176, available at http://www.sciencemag.org/
content/early/2010/12/15/science.1199644).
15 Google Ngram Viewer, CULTUROMICS, http://www.culturomics.org/Resources/Ausers-guide-to-culturomics (last visited Oct. 3, 2013); see also Michel et al., supra note 14,
at 176 (describing the database and related data collection tool).
16 Google Ngram Viewer, supra note 15.
17 Id.
18 Michel et al., supra note 14, at 178, Figure 2; see also id. at 177 (“Our results
suggest that culturomic tools will aid lexicographers in at least two ways: (i) finding
low-frequency words that they do not list, and (ii) providing accurate estimates of current
13
14
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Viewer undoubtedly provides an interesting picture for
discussion of the usage of words and phrases, although it
admittedly has some inherent limitations and some recognized
criticisms of its scientific value.19
The Ngram for the phrase “corporate social responsibility”
shows the phrase’s increased usage over time, and an especially
interesting rate of increase since 2000, likely as a result of our
increased scrutiny of corporations following a series of financial
crises:
TABLE 1:
GOOGLE LABS BOOKS NGRAM VIEWER
GRAPH CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FROM 1900 TO 2008
FROM THE CORPUS OF ENGLISH WITH A SMOOTHING OF 3

Source: GOOGLE BOOKS NGRAM VIEWER, http://books.google.com/ngrams (last visited Oct. 4,
2013) (based on the model and database developed by Jean-Baptiste Michel, Yuan Kui
Shen, Aviva Presser Aiden, Adrian Veres, Matthew K. Gray, William Brockman, The
Google Books Team, Joseph P. Pickett, Dale Hoiberg, Dan Clancy, Peter Norvig, Jon
Orwant, Steven Pinker, Martin A. Nowak, and Erez Lieberman Aiden, Quantitative
Analysis of Culture Using Millions of Digitized Books, SCIENCE, Jan. 14, 2011, at 176).

Table 1 shows trends from 1900 to 2008 (the latest available
date) for the unigram “corporate social responsibility.” The y-axis
shows what percentage of all the unigrams contained in Google’s
sample of books written in English include the phrase “corporate
social responsibility.” “Usage frequency is computed by dividing
the number of instances of the n-gram in a given year by the

frequency trends to reduce the lag between changes in the lexicon and changes in the
dictionary.”).
19 John Bohannon, Google Opens Books to New Cultural Studies, 330 SCIENCE 1600,
1600 (2010) (describing the Ngram project and its initial critics). Peer review is as of yet
limited on this relatively new tool, yet even the creators warn, “[b]asically, if you’re going
to use this corpus for scientific purposes, you’ll need to do careful controls to make sure it
can support your application. Like with any other piece of evidence about the human past,
the challenge with culturomic trajectories lie in their interpretation.” Google Ngram
Viewer, supra note 15. Suggestions for controls are available in the main paper
supporting the application. See also Michel et al., supra note 14, at 181. “Culturomic
results are a new type of evidence in the humanities. As with fossils of ancient creatures,
the challenge of culturomics lies in the interpretation of this evidence.” Id. (giving a few
example searches with interpretations).
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total number of words in the corpus in that year.”20 Smoothing
allows for a consideration of the trends as a moving average and
can be adjusted for any search.21 When one runs the search on
Google, hyperlinks appear underneath the graph, allowing one to
browse through the books available that contributed to the data
set.22
Although the Ngram reveals “corporate social responsibility”
appears in an extremely small percentage of the overall books in
Google’s digitized collection, it certainly shows both a notable
frequency and a significant upward trend in its usage. This is,
admittedly, only a collection of raw data. But the usage and trend
are both apparent.
With an increased discussion of expanded corporate social
responsibilities, the academic, legal, and policy discussions have
also increasingly debated both the existence and meaning of
“stakeholders”—some constituency, larger than the shareholders
of corporations and those with whom the corporation holds
contracts, to which the corporation nonetheless owes some duty
on which to expend corporate resources. As Williams explains,
“the current corporate social responsibility debate often involves
a competition between shareholder versus stakeholder
conceptions of the corporation.”23
According to Professor David Millon, for example, “the
pragmatic definition [of ‘stakeholder’] advanced by business
ethics expert R. Edward Freeman has intuitive appeal, is
reasonably workable, and has proved to be durable: a stakeholder
of a particular corporation is anyone who ‘can affect or is affected
by the achievement of an organization’s objectives.’”24 Millon

20 Michel et al., supra note 14, at 176. The Google Ngram data is “normalize[d] by
the number of books published in each year.” What Does the Ngram Viewer Do?, GOOGLE
BOOKS, http://books.google.com/ngrams/info (last visited Oct. 4, 2013).
21 Google Books describes “smoothing” as follows:
Often trends become more apparent when data is viewed as a moving average.
A smoothing of 1 means that the data shown for 1950 will be an average of the
raw count for 1950 plus 1 value on either side: (“count for 1949” + “count for
1950” + “count for 1951”), divided by 3. So a smoothing of 10 means that 21
values will be averaged: 10 on either side, plus the target value in the center of
them. At the left and right edges of the graph, fewer values are averaged. With
a smoothing of 3, the leftmost value (pretend it’s the year 1950) will be
calculated as (“count for 1950” + “count for 1951” + “count for 1952” + “count
for 1953”), divided by 4.
What Does the Ngram Viewer Do?, supra note 20.
22 Id. (“Below the graph, we show ‘interesting’ year ranges for your query terms.
Clicking on those will submit your query directly to Google Books.”).
23 Williams, supra note 1, at 707.
24 Millon, supra note 5, at 920 (quoting R. EDWARD FREEMAN, STRATEGIC
MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER APPROACH 46 (1984)).
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adequately explains these persons affected (and thereby defined
as “stakeholders”) as including “workers, creditors, local
communities, suppliers, consumers, and those affected by the
corporation’s impact on the environment.”25 Freeman and
Millon’s definition captures the essence of what most people
mean by the term. But the “anyone who can affect or is affected
by” language should be sufficient for the reader to understand
the potentially unlimited breadth of possible stakeholder
constituencies.
Tracking the rise of the usage of the word “stakeholder” over
time is another interesting way to illustrate the injection of
corporate social responsibility into our vocabulary and usage. The
Ngram tool allows the researcher to compare two terms or
phrases, thus Table 2 provides the Ngrams for both “shareholder”
and “stakeholder.”
TABLE 2:
GOOGLE LABS BOOKS NGRAM VIEWER
GRAPH SHAREHOLDER (UPPER LINE) V. STAKEHOLDER (LOWER LINE)
FROM 1800 TO 2008 FROM THE CORPUS OF ENGLISH WITH A SMOOTHING OF 3

Source: GOOGLE BOOKS NGRAM VIEWER, http://books.google.com/ngrams (last visited Oct. 4,
2013) (based on the model and database developed by Jean-Baptiste Michel, Yuan Kui
Shen, Aviva Presser Aiden, Adrian Veres, Matthew K. Gray, William Brockman, The
Google Books Team, Joseph P. Pickett, Dale Hoiberg, Dan Clancy, Peter Norvig, Jon
Orwant, Steven Pinker, Martin A. Nowak, and Erez Lieberman Aiden, Quantitative
Analysis of Culture Using Millions of Digitized Books, SCIENCE, Jan. 14, 2011, at 176).

Table 2 shows trends from 1800 to 2008 (the latest available
date) for the unigrams “stockholder” as the upper line and
“stakeholder” as the lower line. As Table 2 shows, the usage of
“shareholder” has seen a rather steady increase from the
mid-1800s to the mid-1970s, with a heightened rate of increase in
frequency of usage since the late 1970s and early 1980s.
“Stakeholder” barely registers on the graph before the late 1970s
and has since shown a steadily sharp rise across the past three
decades. This data regarding the use of the term in books stands
25

Id.
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as a possible proxy for its overall importance in the corporate law
discussion. The rise in usage illustrated here coincides with an
increasing importance given to the stakeholder concept in
corporate law discussions.
It is clear that corporate social responsibility is a
continuingly important part of the current corporate law
discourse. As noted at the outset of this Part, there are two
extremes involved in this debate that see the duty of a
corporation
quite
differently.
For
those
with
a
wealth-maximization view, corporate social responsibility has
little meaning beyond maximizing the wealth of the shareholders
and complying with contracts and the law.26 Any benefits to the
rest of society are happy benefits of the corporation’s focus on
profits.27 Occupying the other pole in the spectrum, another view
might be described as the progressive or expansive side, oriented
toward advocating for broad-based duties for the corporation—
both morally and legally. For this side, there is a greater
constituency other than shareholders (even including at times all
of “society”) with whom profits must be shared, for the protection
of whom profits may need to be sacrificed, or for the benefit of
whom expenditures must be made.28
I have described the conflict in previous work as requiring us
to decide what guidance we suggest and what requirements we
impose (as a matter of law or policy) to define “proper” corporate
decision-making:
The spectrum between these extremes resembles the classic
debate over the negative and positive rights of man as they relate to
obligation and the justification for intervention by institutions of
power. The corporate social responsibility discussion raises three
principal issues about how a moral corporation lives its life: how a
corporation chooses its self-interest versus the interests of others,
when and how it should help others if control decisions may harm the
shareholder owners, and how far the corporation must affirmatively

26 See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962); see also Milton
Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is To Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES
MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 32.
27 Elsewhere I have described this side of the spectrum as viewing “the concept of
corporate social responsibility as essentially nonexistent, unless it happens to be an
accidental and spontaneous outcome of otherwise self-interested financial motives of a
profit-maximizing corporation.” Donald J. Kochan, Legal Mechanization of Corporate
Social Responsibility Through Alien Tort Statute Litigation: A Response to Professor
Branson with Some Supplemental Thoughts, 9 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 251, 254 (2011)
[hereinafter Kochan, Mechanization].
28 In previous work, I have described this extreme as one that advances the notion
that “corporations should become governmental surrogates, conscripted philanthropists,
or otherwise constrained with affirmative perceived-moral obligations that can be
compelled by coercive force.” Id.
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go to help right the perceived wrongs in the world in which it
operates.29

These issues go to the heart of the debate about the meaning
of corporate social responsibility. The remaining sections in this
Part will further examine in more detail the sides of the
spectrum in this corporate social responsibility debate and will
take a look at each side’s expectations for the law’s role in
protecting or advancing its positions.
B. The Shareholder Wealth- or Profit-Maximization Camp
Regardless of whether one adopts a separation of ownership
and control conception of the corporation or a nexus of contracts
conception, both accept a wealth-maximization model of
corporate social responsibility (even if for slightly different
reasons).30 The primary constraint on corporate behavior is not
the advancement of some vague social interest but instead is the
advancement of profits within the bounds of the law, which
includes compliance with contracts and compliance with
otherwise generally applicable legal rules and regulations.31
Despite extensive efforts to dislodge it, this traditional view also
remains the predominantly accepted legal view of a corporation’s
social responsibility.32
Proponents of the wealth-maximization view claim that
these more certain and limited metrics are not only substantively
superior, but they are also better defined—making them more
manageable and more susceptible to monitoring. As Clark
explains, “[a] single, objective goal like profit-maximization is

29 Id. (citing CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 1 (1978) (writing generally on the
obligations of man and his relation to the state using an analogous set of choices)).
30 See Bainbridge, In Defense, supra note 6, at 1427–28 (some reach a preference for
the wealth-maximization norm but as a result of a nexus of contracts theory of corporate
law rather than focusing on the separation of ownership and control).
31 Clark explains the idea that profit is conditioned upon compliance with applicable
law as follows:
[T]he profit-maximizing norm does not imply that corporations and their
managers have only minimal legal obligations to persons other than
shareholders. Quite the contrary is true. Every major relationship between the
corporation and persons or groups it affects is subject to vast and intricate
bodies of legal doctrine and to legal enforcement mechanisms. These legal
controls are ineffective in some instances and suboptimal in others, but they
exist.
ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 16.2 (1986).
32 See Mark J. Roe, The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial
Organization, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2063, 2065 (2001) (“Shareholder wealth maximization is
usually accepted as the appropriate goal in American business circles.”); Williams, supra
note 1, at 714 (describing profit-maximization and that the “predominant academic view
in the United States about corporate social responsibility is directly derived from the
shareholder theory of the corporation”).
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more easily monitored than a multiple, vaguely defined goal like
fair and reasonable accommodation of all affected interests.”33
The work of Milton Friedman is often associated as the
standard
bearer
for
this
“wealth-maximizing”
or
“profit-maximizing” view of corporate social responsibility.34 As
Friedman states:
The view . . . that corporate officials and labor leaders have a
‘social responsibility’ that goes beyond serving the interest of their
stockholders
or
their
members . . . shows
a
fundamental
misconception of the character and nature of a free economy. In such
an economy, there is one and only one social responsibility of
business—to use its resources and engage in activities designed to
increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game,
which is to say, engages in open and free competition, without
deception or fraud. 35

This wealth-maximization view also famously finds support
in the 1919 Michigan Supreme Court decision in Dodge v. Ford
Motor Company where the court denounced Henry Ford’s plan to
share profits with employees at the expense of shareholders.36
There the court explicated clear limits on the discretion of
corporations to take into account broader social interests in its
expenditures of profits:
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the
profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be
employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised in
the choice of means to attain that end, and does not extend to a
change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits, or to the
nondistribution of profits among stockholders in order to devote them
to other purposes.37

Dodge remains a dominant force in defining the prevailing
view of corporate social responsibility within corporate law.38
This view as expressed by Friedman and in Dodge is largely
based on the traditional notion of the corporation as involving the
separation of ownership and control. This position rejects any

CLARK, supra note 31, § 16.2.
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 564 (2003) (“Milton Friedman’s famous essay on
corporate responsibility remains the classic statement of the shareholder primacy
model.”); see also Roe, supra note 32, at 2065 n.2 (2001) (“Although aggressive when it
appeared, Friedman’s perspective is now mainstream in American business circles . . . .”).
35 FRIEDMAN, supra note 26, at 133; see also Friedman, supra note 26, at 124.
36 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919).
37 Id.
38 See Bainbridge, In Defense, supra note 6, at 1423–24 (“[T]he mainstream of
corporate law remains committed to the principles espoused by the Dodge court.”).
33
34
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and all duties to those other than the shareholders.39 It contends
that corporate decisions to spend shareholder profits on societal
needs or goods imposes a tax on, or constitutes a wealth transfer
from, those shareholders and that it illegitimately does so
without shareholder consent.40 Others reach the same conclusion
regarding wealth-maximization as the optimal restraint on
corporate decisions, although adopting a nexus of contracts
conception of the corporation whereby the corporation’s scope of
duty is itself constrained in a manner that does not directly take
into account outside stakeholder constituencies.41
Importantly, as Ribstein notes, “the legal issue is not
whether the corporation or any of the individuals who manage it
should care about society.”42 The better question is “whether the
law should mandate such governance, given lawmakers’ inherent
limitations, the potential costs of legal rules, and disagreements
about appropriate social objectives.”43 The wealth-maximization
view does not mean that corporate managers are heartless or
that corporations will fail to contribute to social welfare. As
previously mentioned, the economic growth spurred by
corporations pursuing profits helps all of society. And specifically,
those in the wealth-maximization camp point to the jobs created,
the contracting engaged in that consumes goods and services, the
goods produced and services provided, and the taxes paid by
corporations, for example, as evidence that corporations are

As Macey explains:
Under traditional state and corporate law doctrine, officers and directors of
both public and closely held firms owe fiduciary duties to shareholders and to
shareholders alone. Directors and officers are legally required to manage a
corporation for the exclusive benefit of its shareholders, and protection for
other sorts of claimants exists only to the extent provided by contract.
Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making
Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L.
REV. 23, 23 (1991) [hereinafter Macey, An Economic Analysis]; see also THE AM. LAW
INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 2.01(a) (1994) (“[A] corporation . . . should have as its objective the conduct of business
activities with a view to enhancing corporate profit and shareholder gain.”).
40 Aneel Karnani, The Case Against Corporate Social Responsibility, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 23, 2010, at R1 (“Managers who sacrifice profit for the common good also are in
effect imposing a tax on their shareholders and arbitrarily deciding how that money
should be spent.”).
41 Bainbridge, In Defense, supra note 6, at 1429–30 (under the nexus of contracts,
wealth-maximization and fiduciary duties exclusive to shareholders is set as the efficient
default rule away from which rational investors will not likely deviate).
42 See Larry E. Ribstein, Accountability and Responsibility in Corporate Governance,
81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1431, 1432 (2006).
43 Id. at 1432–33 (emphasis added).
39
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helping others when pursuing their own profit-maximizing
ends.44
One
of
the
most
important
constraints
on
wealth-maximization is that a corporation is duty-bound to
comply with the law. As Clark explains, the view holds that
“[p]rofits should be made as large as possible, within the [limited
legitimate] constraints,” which first and foremost includes
compliance with the law.45
There is yet another important limitation that deserves
special mention as well. It is an obvious but too often ignored
sub-constraint within the wealth-maximization constraint—the
power of consumer demand and the price system. As Ludwig von
Mises has explained, corporate power is only as good as the
orders given by the captains of the market—the consumers:
The direction of all economic affairs is in the market society a task
of the entrepreneurs. Theirs is the control of production. They are at
the helm and steer the ship. A superficial observer would believe that
they are supreme. But they are not. They are bound to obey
unconditionally the captain’s orders. The captain is the consumer.46

Consumers have the ability to “pay” for their own preferred
social responsibility of corporations. If they truly value it and
desire it, then any rational profit-maximizing corporation will
provide it.47 Consumers and shareholders alike have the power to
purchase corporate social responsibility outcomes. That is a
cause and consequence quite distinct from coercively dictating
those results. As Friedman added, “The stockholders or the
customers or the employes [sic] could separately spend their own
money on the particular action if they wished to do so.”48
Corporations will supply a product that naturally arises in a
market where consumers demand products that are socially
responsible and are willing to pay for any additional cost for the
44 Williams, supra note 1, at 714 (explaining the wealth-maximization view and its
claims regarding ways that “corporations meet t heir proper social responsibilities by
excelling in their economic activities, which then contributes to a well-functioning
economy . . . .”).
45 CLARK, supra note 31, § 16.2.
46 LUDWIG VON MISES, HUMAN ACTION: A TREATISE ON ECONOMICS 270 (3d rev. ed.
1963).
47 Id. at 648–49. Mises explains:
All market phenomena are ultimately determined by the choices of the
consumers. If one wants to apply the notion of power to phenomena of the
market, one ought to say: in the market all power is vested in the consumers.
The entrepreneurs are forced, by the necessity of earning profits and avoiding
losses, to consider in every regard . . . the best possible and cheapest
satisfaction of the consumers as their supreme directive.
Id. at 649.
48 Friedman, supra note 26, at 33.
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production of that demanded product. If adding a corporate social
responsibility element to a product makes the production of the
corporation’s goods or the provision of the corporation’s services
more expensive, presumably those additional costs can be
captured by an increased price that a willing consumer base will
pay because they value the additional efforts made by the
corporation.49
Thus, consumers themselves absorb the costs to the
corporation for the provision of that socially beneficial good. A
socially responsible ingredient is added to a product, proactively
or reactively, and that ingredient meets consumer demand.
Whether it is a demand for “green” and recycled toilet paper,
non-GMO corn, fuel-efficient vehicles, energy-conserving
appliances, or similar products, if purchasers exist, then the
corporations will label, market, and supply these products.50
Elsewhere, I have described this corporate reaction as achieving
socially responsible outcomes as a result of internally induced,
profit-driven, and voluntary behavior.51
So long as demand is the sole reason for the provision of the
good and the consumer market is willing to bear the costs of
production through higher prices, such corporate actions are
justified within the wealth-maximization norm. In that case, if
demand disappears, the corporation is under no compulsion to
continue providing that good.
It then becomes the individual responsibility of consumers to
apply pressure with their own resources, pocketbooks, and
buying power—rather than the law—to alter corporate behavior.
Mises explains that the consumers run the show and dictate
what is made and how it is made. “Their buying and their
abstention from buying decides who should own and run the
plants and the farms. They make poor people rich and rich people
poor. They determine precisely what should be produced, in what
quality, and in what quantities.”52
The expansive corporate social responsibility advocates
would rather, however, push for top-down imposition of corporate
social responsibility standards forcing corporations and their
shareholders to accept losses by bankrolling the social programs
rather than those advocates themselves paying directly for the

See generally Karnani, supra note 40.
Id. (describing new markets for fuel-efficient cars, energy-conserving products,
and healthier foods as examples, explaining that “in cases where private profits and
public interests are aligned, the idea of corporate social responsibility is irrelevant . . . .”).
51 Kochan, Mechanization, supra note 27, at 255.
52 Id.
49
50

Do Not Delete

3/18/2014 8:16 PM

2014] Corporate Social Responsibility in a Remedy-Seeking Society

429

desired behavior and social outcomes. As usual, instead of
accessing market mechanisms to satisfy their preferences, these
activist interest groups engage in rent-seeking behavior to obtain
these social “gains” for some cost less than what they would have
to pay if bargained for in a free and fair open market exchange. 53
Finally, seemingly altruistic or charitable actions may be
taken voluntarily by corporations where the impetus for the
donation or other action is the calculated benefit to profits from
the action due to an ability to capitalize on marketing, branding,
or other means of increasing the consumer base or attracting
additional investors. Reputation enhancing efforts based on these
criteria of self-interest should be considered internally induced
and voluntary. These efforts will cease when they are no longer
profitable for the corporation. If the decision is made in order to
maximize profits, it falls into this category of voluntary behavior
that nonetheless leads to concurrently meeting both profit-based
and social concerns.
Often, however, as discussed in more detail below, neither
the wealth-maximization norm and its constraints on corporate
behavior nor the beneficial effects of corporate profits on society
are enough to achieve the remedies and results sought by those
usually advocating for greater social responsibilities. Those
advocates claim that existing conditions and allocations of profits
leave other so-called stakeholders or otherwise “affected”
individuals in unsatisfactory positions.54 They contend that this
deficiency should be met with more law to constrain the
operations of the corporations, including an altered definition of
legal duties owed.
C. The Expansive, Remedy-Seeking Notion of Corporate Social
Responsibility and Its Broader Vision of Corporate Duties and
Obligations
Advocates for a broad or progressive notion of corporate
social responsibility argue that there is, or should be, some
broader constituency to which a duty is owed beyond
shareholders,55 those involved in contractual relationships with

See infra Part II.
Adefolake Adeyeye, The Role of Global Governance in CSR, 9 SANTA CLARA J.
INT’L L. 147, 149 (2011) (“CSR focuses on the attempt to regulate corporate behavior in
order to ensure that corporations carry out their activities in consideration to
multi-stakeholder interests.”).
55 Williams, supra note 1, at 716 (“[P]rogressive scholars contend that directors
ought to consider the impact of their decisions on a wider range of constituents than
shareholders, and thus ought to consider the implications of their actions on employees,
consumers, suppliers (in some cases), the community, and the environment.”).
53
54
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the corporation, or those harmed by corporate behavior under
traditional notions of harm.56 On the latter, corporate social
responsibility theories sometimes rest on an expanded and
different kind of definition of harm.57
As mentioned before, corporate social responsibility has
many definitions and manifestations. Even among the
progressive or expansionist advocates of corporate social
responsibility, there is little agreement as to the goals or
mechanisms for achieving corporate social responsibility or
advancing broader stakeholder interests vis-à-vis corporate
power.58 Professor Larry Ribstein, for example, has explained
that “[t]he debate over corporate social responsibility is often
vague or unrealistic or both.”59 He continued that those
participants seeking greater responsibilities for corporations
“speak in terms of how corporations ought to be run, without
specifying the legal changes that will produce these results.”60
Friedman noted that “[t]he discussions of the ‘social
responsibilities of business’ are notable for their analytical
looseness and lack of rigor.”61 Although many expansionist
corporate social responsibility advocates are united in their
desire to restrict the universe of acceptable corporate behaviors,
they are not necessarily in agreement on all positions within that
broader framework.62
Despite the sometimes less than cohesive message, corporate
social responsibility activism, whatever its iteration, has
strength in its optics. “‘Corporate social responsibility’ is a term
that sounds difficult to quibble with as a goal. It exudes a sense
of ‘the good’ or ‘the proper.’”63 After all, it is hard to defend the
opposite—“irresponsibility.” Much like other terms for

56 See Millon, supra note 5, at 919 (“The ‘social’ element of CSR is the idea that
corporations have responsibilities to the broader society.”).
57 See Bainbridge, In Defense, supra note 6, at 1432 (corporate social responsibility
advocates are worried about the costs that corporate actors supposedly impose upon
nonshareholder “constituencies”).
58 Williams, supra note 1, at 775 (“While many advocates of more corporate social
responsibility share a concern that managing global corporations to maximize shareholder
wealth has the potential to lead to harmful social effects, including exacerbating
persistent income inequalities, there is much less agreement about how to suggest
reforming corporate law to address that concern.”).
59 Ribstein, supra note 42, at 1432; see also Williams, supra note 1, at 706
(expressing similar difficulties with the definition).
60 Ribstein, supra note 42, at 1432.
61 Friedman, supra note 26, at 33.
62 Millon, supra note 5, at 919 (“Even among sympathetic analysts, key questions
generate controversy. There is disagreement about the role of business in society, the
persons to whom a business should be responsible, the responsibility that should entail,
and so on.”).
63 Kochan, Mechanization, supra note 27, at 254.
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movements, corporate social responsibility as captured by the
expansionist view exudes an image of purity and virtue. At the
same time, much of the corporate social responsibility advocacy
paints a very nasty picture of corporate behavior and a very
myopic view of the (un)worthiness of profit. Profit motive is seen
as merely (and unseemly) greedy and the contributions of
economic growth to the betterment of society64 become ignored.
Moreover, within the advocacy or scholarship on the expansive
view of corporate social responsibility, there is minimal
discussion of negative rights, economic liberty, or laissez faire
philosophy as part of the rubric of what constitutes, or
contributes to, human rights and freedom.65 Nor is there much
discussion of the general improvements on the human condition
that derive from development and investment.66 Those with an
expansive definition of corporate social responsibility exploit
every avenue to create a negative image of corporations and
downplay their positive contributions to society. Either through
demonization of wealth or simply a fear of the “large,” corporate
behavior is seen as requiring some external check or control
especially when we are told that it contributes to the awful
conditions for many in areas where corporations operate.67 These
informational and perceptual imbalances further disadvantage
those forwarding wealth-maximization as the better view.
In fact, the messaging becomes so powerful and difficult to
rebut that Friedman warned corporations that they endanger
themselves when they even enter the fray of a corporate social
responsibility discussion, because they risk legitimizing the
terms of the debate as being based in a battle between good and
64 See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 31, § 16.2 (large organizations like corporations,
“increase social welfare, because without them certain large-scale business ventures
would be impossible or would be carried out in a wasteful way”).
65 On these concepts and their contribution to social welfare, see 3 FRIEDRICH A.
HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY (1979); MISES, supra note 46, at 257–326; see
also generally FRIEDMAN, supra note 26.
66 As Adam Smith described:
Every individual is continually exerting himself to find out the most
advantageous employment for whatever capital he can command. It is his own
advantage, indeed, and not that of society, which he has in view. But the study
of his own advantage naturally, or rather necessarily leads him to prefer
employment which is most advantageous to the society . . . . [H]e intends only
his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand
to promote an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is it always the
worse for the society that it was no part of it. By pursuing his own interest he
frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really
intends to promote it.
ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS ,
421, 423 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1937) (1776); see also Jan Narveson, The “Invisible Hand,”
46 J. BUS. ETHICS 201, 201 (2003).
67 Adeyeye, supra note 54, at 149.
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evil.68 He cautioned that corporate managers engaging in
corporate social responsibility talk are legitimizing the “already
too prevalent view that the pursuit of profits is wicked and
immoral and must be curbed and controlled by external forces.”69
There is little doubt that the jargon painting those directly or
indirectly (and, often, tenuously at best) affected by corporate
action as the oppressed, and corporations as their oppressors,
provides powerful marketing for the social responsibility cause.70
The expansionist corporate social responsibility view tends to
be one partly grounded in entitlement and a poorly conceived
concept of justice and blame.71 When bad things happen in the
world, people search for someone to blame and expect someone to
pay.72 Advocates of increased corporate social responsibility—as
they are searching to find somebody to blame and get
compensation from—seem to tout the claim that the law must
provide a “remedy for every wrong.”73
Not every perceived wrong, financial hardship, disparity,
inequality, or other perceived hardship can find relief from the
law and the legal system.74 “While it may seem that there should
be a remedy for every wrong, this is an ideal limited perforce by
Friedman, supra note 26, at 32.
Id.
As I have previously described:
The marketing of law or ideas is advanced by the terms used to define the
goals of expanded limitations on corporate behavior: rights, responsibilities,
duties, human rights, morality, ethics, virtue, equality, accountability, and the
like. It is against the backdrop of stories of genocide, killings, abuse,
oppression, despair, poverty, inequality, slavery, starvation, arms, unjust
imprisonment, apartheid, the Holocaust, greed, [and] selfishness . . . . It is easy
to “sell” the ideas and projects that seek to solve or remedy these problems.
Kochan, Mechanization, supra note 27, at 254.
71 See Sonja B. Starr, Rethinking “Effective Remedies”: Remedial Deterrence in
International Courts, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693, 698 (2008) (“International courts and
scholars habitually invoke the principle of ubi ius ibi remedium—‘where there is a right,
there is a remedy.’”).
72 Millon, supra note 5, at 919 (quoting Joel Bakan categorizing corporations as the
“externalizing machine” because of corporate potential to ignore adverse third-party
effects) (quoting JOEL BAKAN, THE CORPORATION: PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF PROFIT AND
POWER 60–84 (2005)).
73 For example, calling on the maxim ubi ius ibi remedium, one author in favor of
expansive corporate social responsibility and promoting human rights litigation concluded
that
[a]llowing corporations and State officials to escape liability for their acts
simply because they occurred in countries without adequate legal structures to
address them does damage to the concept of Rule of Law and defeats the whole
idea that where there is a breach of a legal right, a remedy must attach.
Emeka Duruigbo, The Economic Cost of Alien Tort Litigation: A Response to Awakening
Monster: The Alien Tort Statute of 1789, 14 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 40 & n.235 (2004).
74 See, e.g., Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 373 (1983) (recognizing that the court will
not fashion a remedy without a right and even then only when determining congressional
intent and considering broader policy concerns).
68
69
70
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the realities of this world.”75 The legal system is not intended to
provide a legal remedy for every wrong, harm, injury, or
unfortunate social condition.76 Nor is the legal system responsible
for constructing itself to deliver a private party to blame and
force that party to somehow make perceived wrongs right.
Emotions and tragic stories aside, legal doctrines cannot mold
themselves to such situations.77
Before any remedy can be applied or the law constructed in a
manner to require a payment from one (like a corporation) to
another (some segment of society benefitted by CSR-based
investment), there must be a “right” recognized by law. The
proposed beneficiaries of corporate philanthropy have earned no
such right.
That limitation—that only rights are protected—explains
why the maxim ubi ius ibi remedium loosely translates as
establishing triggering conditions: for every right, there is a
remedy. Even that phrase has further limits. Blackstone has
explained that “it is a general and indisputable rule, that where
there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy, by suit or
action at law, whenever that right is invaded . . . . [I]t is a settled
and invariable principle in the laws of England, that every right
when with-held must have a remedy, and every injury it’s [sic]
proper redress.”78 This concept, as explained by Blackstone and
when understood in context, makes clear that there is only a
right with a corresponding remedy if we also identify a duty (and
afterward of course also find some violation of that duty which
directly causes harm that is traceable to such a violation).
Every right must have a corresponding duty before one can
claim any entitlement to action by another. This often-projected
maxim that “there must be a right for every wrong” is improperly
invoked if there is not a rights/duty analysis.79 And only those
who have that duty or obligation can be sued or otherwise held
responsible for a wrong (not to mention all of the other hurdles

75 Tobin v. Grossman, 249 N.E.2d 419, 424 (N.Y. 1969) (explaining the facts of our
system that the limits of the law mean that there are “limit[s] to attaining essential
justice”).
76 Hall v. Trisun, No. CIVA SA05CA0984 OG, 2005 WL 3348956 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 16,
2005) (“Plaintiff is advised that the law does not provide a remedy for every injury
suffered. Moreover, the jurisdiction of a federal court to resolve disputes is inherently
limited.”).
77 See Howard v. Lecher, 366 N.E.2d 64, 66 (N.Y. 1977) (discussing that even where
the “temptation is great to offer . . . some form of relief,” it is “not the function of the law”
to provide a remedy for every wrong).
78 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 23, 109 (Univ.
of Chicago Press 2002) (1765).
79 See Perodeau v. City of Hartford, 792 A.2d 752, 768 (Conn. 2002).
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like causation that must then be proved). Many attempts to
increase the scope of corporate liability face these hurdles. The
reality is that reform cannot always be accomplished through the
imposition of new legal rules, although that fact may be
unsatisfactory to those looking for their concept of justice.80
Despite all the ills of the world, we must maintain the limits of
the law, and we should appreciate what the law can and cannot
do effectively.81
The rhetoric of corporate social responsibility sometimes
ignores these bedrock principles and necessary prerequisites to
the identification of legitimate legal obligations. At other times,
expansionist advocates seek to redefine human relations and
expand the concept of duty far beyond any meaningful constraint.
They begin to invest in the creation of law or legal liability
regimes to advance their interests. Corporate social
responsibility activism illustrates that segments of society
believe that cures for all things that are seemingly wrong in
society may be found in the creation of law or the imposition of
new legal liabilities. We live in a remedy-seeking society that
often embraces these ideas of liability hunting. And, in the sense
that these activists push for an alteration in corporate duties to
obtain the remedies they seek, those groups are remedy-seeking
through rent-seeking, as will be discussed in the next Part. Yet,
there must be limits to the capacity of the law to accomplish
these ends.
In the end, modern expansionist notions of corporate social
responsibility can be seen as seeking an alteration in behavior—a
new ethic in corporate conduct based on the desire to alter
corporate behavior to achieve certain socially desirable outcomes.
It seeks to identify harms, isolate causes of such harms, control
negative externalities from doing business, and concomitantly
induce or force corporations to internalize the purported larger
costs and broader range of impacts from their actions.82 The
proliferation of expansive corporate social responsibility efforts
has been effective at inducing changes in corporate behavior—
leaving aside whether or not such changes are wise.

80 James R. Adams, From Babel to Reason: An Examination of the Duty Issue, 31
MCGEORGE L. REV. 25, 53 (1999) (“Tort law does not provide a remedy for every harm. We
cannot solve every social problem by simply ‘passing a law.’ There are many ways to
control conduct; tort law is but one.”).
81 Tobin v. Grossman, 249 N.E.2d 419, 424 (N.Y. 1969) (“The problem for the law is
to limit the legal consequences of wrongs to a controllable degree,” and therefore
attenuated causation cannot be actionable).
82 Millon, supra note 5, at 919 (discussing the “social costs” that a profitable
corporation can impose).
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Just as the measure and the meaning of corporate social
responsibility are varied, the mechanisms for achieving the aims
of those favoring an expanded notion of corporate social
responsibility can equally take a number of different forms. Some
of these involve bottom-up private market forces while others
seek to alter the legal landscape top-down with fundamental
changes in statutes, judicially recognized common law or
statutory liabilities, or other legal outlets for reform.
D. The Tactical Basics for Reformers: What Can Law Do to
Affect Greater Corporate Social Responsibility?
In past work, I characterized some of the mechanisms that
could accomplish corporate social responsibility objectives along a
spectrum of increasing levels of coercive rules—from
non-coercive, voluntary decisions by corporations aligned with
their own interests in wealth-maximization all the way to the
highest levels of coercively induced mechanisms of command and
control over the decision-making of corporations and their
distributions of profits.83 In this section, I want to focus on just a
few of the more specific efforts that can be taken to try to achieve
one’s corporate social responsibility objectives.
As explained above, the first (and most legitimate) option for
achieving one’s desired corporate social responsibility results is
through purchasing the outcome. If, indeed, consumers demand a
particular corporate effort that they deem socially desirable, then
the consumer demand is enough incentive for a
profit-maximizing corporation to provide that corporate social
responsibility “product.” Despite all the talk about the big bad
powerful “corporations” in expansive corporate social
responsibility and other progressive rhetoric, it is the consumers,
after all, that have the power.84 Mises again explains that,
“[o]wnership of material factors of production as well as
entrepreneurial or technological skill do not—in the market
economy—bestow power in the coercive sense. All they grant is
the privilege to serve the real masters of the market, the
consumers, in a more exalted position than other people.”85 The
price of the goods or services will be adjusted upward if they have
added costs from social responsibility efforts included in the
production of goods or provision of services. But, presumably, if
Kochan, Mechanization, supra note 27, at 255–57.
MISES, supra note 46, at 649 (“It is customary nowadays to signify the position
which the owners of property and the entrepreneurs occupy on the market as economic
power or market power. This terminology is misleading when applied to the conditions of
the market.”).
85 Id. (emphasis added).
83
84
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consumers desire that extra “CSR ingredient” in the product,
then they will be willing to pay the higher price. It will be an
incident (or an accident) of the corporation making
wealth-maximization decisions.
Corporate social responsibility advocates can also try to work
within existing law to compel corporate decisions that are
socially responsible in the advocates’ minds. Advocates can
become shareholders and try to change things from the inside—
through, for example, voting their shares, proxy solicitations,
hostile takeovers, direct lawsuits, derivative lawsuits, and other
means. Admittedly these options will be constrained so long as
the legal definitions of duty remain aligned with the
wealth-maximization model. Thus, the more effective technique
for these interest groups is to use these avenues as a way to
attempt change regarding the contours of board of directors’
duties and the vision of the corporate role. There is a part of the
corporate social responsibility movement that tries to change the
governing rules or metrics of corporate decision-making—to limit
the range of acceptable corporate profit decisions and allow more
room or even mandate so-called socially responsible choices or
stakeholder concerns to be taken into account. The advocates
would need to overcome the default rules and convince a
corporation to structure itself with different standards and
duties, or they would need to convince the judiciary to amend
traditional notions of fiduciary duties. Again, these are difficult
tasks but it may be worthwhile for advocates to invest in these
efforts to cause legal change.
When unable to achieve their corporate social responsibility
objectives within corporate law or through a change in the rules
of traditional corporate governance, the corporate social
responsibility lobby diverts its attention and resources elsewhere.
Corporate social responsibility advocates may seek legislation
that imposes new duties on corporations and their boards of
directors that align with the social interests of the advocates.
So-called “stakeholder statutes” or “constituency statutes”
allowing or requiring corporations to take stakeholders into
account in decision-making are obvious examples of these
efforts.86

86 See generally Kathleen Hale, Note, Corporate Law and Stakeholders: Moving
Beyond Stakeholder Statutes, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 823, 833 (2003) (describing stakeholder
statutes); Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing
Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579 (1992) (discussing the constituency
statute approach). More recently, we have also seen “social enterprise” statutes and
“benefit corporation” regimes emerge that attempt to further similar goals. See, e.g., Brian
D. Galle, Social Enterprise: Who Needs It?, 54 B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013), available
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The corporate social responsibility lobby can also seek to
change the substantive law—to regulate the conduct of business
activities or to create new duties or liabilities for certain entities
and certain behaviors. The expansion of the operating liabilities
of businesses and the narrowing of acceptable practices by
creating substantive prohibitions or tort liabilities for corporate
actions can be accomplished by changing the contents of
legislative or regulatory standards. And, these substantive rules
can also be changed in the courts through the development of
new liability schemes, identification of new harms, or creation of
new duties.
Rather than convincing corporations to change their
decision-making calculus or transforming their concept of duty,
and rather than seeking legislation or judicial standards
generally altering the definition of a corporation’s fiduciary
duties to include secondary stakeholders, corporate social
responsibility advocates often seek to manipulate the substantive
law to force corporations into making corporate social
responsibility investments—to the detriment of shareholder
interests—through means of pressure quite apart from truly
voluntary decision-making choice. This is accomplished, in part,
by creating an atmosphere of threatened liability that changes
the respective bargaining power of the corporate social
responsibility lobby and arms them with substantial leverage
which it can deploy against corporations in efforts to “convince”
corporations to change behaviors.87 The effects are no less
damaging than outright legislatively demanded changes in
corporate law. Corporations shift resources into suboptimal
investments in secondary stakeholder concerns at the expense of
distributing profits to their primary shareholders. It diverts
resources and misallocates profits into non-shareholder
investments. The beauty of such efforts for the corporate social
responsibility lobby is that even if they are not entirely successful
in creating law (or even when any such efforts have not yet been
completed), the corporate social responsibility lobby can start to
use the threat of law and the threat of completing a legal regime
to change the power dynamics.88 The corporate social
responsibility lobby can leverage the possible creation of law or

at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2302658 (discussing the political economy of social enterprise
statutes and questioning the motives and effectiveness of such legislation).
87 Robert S. Adler & Elliot M. Silverstein, When David Meets Goliath: Dealing with
Power Differentials in Negotiation, 5 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 5 (2000) (“The degree of
power that each party brings to the negotiation affects the room for maneuver that each
feels is available in bargaining situations.”).
88 Id. at 20 (discussing power dynamics between litigating parties).
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the risk of adverse judgments in a manner that paints
corporations into a corner, stimulating changes in behavior to
stave off the threatened legal maneuver.89
Whatever the means—or at least those means outside of
engaging, as consumers or otherwise, in truly voluntary contracts
with corporations—used to seek a remedy for the harms
expansive corporate social responsibility advocates believe are
the fault of corporate behavior and attributable to the traditional
corporate wealth-maximization model, these advocates are acting
in a manner consistent with public choice models of interest
group behavior. Whether through seeking legislation, litigation
advancing novel theories of liability for corporate behaviors such
as for “aiding and abetting” nasty foreign regimes, shareholder
activism, derivative suits, or other means, corporate social
responsibility advocacy operatives meet the classic definition of
interest groups and should be treated with the same skepticism
as we might give anyone attempting to manipulate the law for
private gain. These advocates are advancing their own agendas
and the wealth and power of their own organizations in the
process of seeking special treatment from the law.
While expansive corporate social responsibility advocates
may claim that their efforts to change the law are for “the public
interest” or the overall “social good,” they are asking for a wealth
transfer from the corporations and their shareholders to those
who will supposedly benefit from the corporate social
responsibility efforts demanded. Expansive corporate social
responsibility efforts are redistributive in nature. The
concentrated corporate social responsibility interest groups seek
payments in the form of corporate social responsibility reforms or
measures by the corporation, and the costs of complying are
borne by the shareholders in the form of sacrificed profits.
There is no reason to believe that corporate social
responsibility advocates are any less inclined to tap into the law
as a means of serving their ends. The next Part will explain how
these efforts by corporate social responsibility activists
dangerously conscript the law for inappropriate means. Legal
rules should not be fitted through manipulation as
outcome-based vehicles for social reform.

89

Id.
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II. CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY ADVOCATES
AND LITIGANTS AS INTEREST GROUPS IN A
PUBLIC CHOICE PERSPECTIVE
This Part introduces public choice theory to set forth the
primary lesson of this Article—expansive corporate social
responsibility advocacy should be viewed in light of what we
know about interest group politics. We should not pay any special
deference to the aims of these seemingly beneficial groups simply
because their names and cause sound in the public interest.
Corporate social responsibility advocacy is still private interest
advocacy and any attempt to use the law to reposition one’s
status within the bargaining market is, indeed, still rent-seeking,
despite the “social responsibility” labels.
Rent-seeking and private advantage are often behind
legislation, regulation, and the creation of law generally.90
Corporate social responsibility lawmaking efforts may sound like
they are in the “public interest,”91 and for a long time the
dominant theory in political science presumed that legislation
was and could be crafted with social welfare enhancing effects
and intent.92 This concept that laws can be created for some
common good isolated from interest group influence has been
challenged by public choice theory,93 exposing the public interest
model to the real world operations and effects of interest group
influence in legal and political decision-making.94 Public choice
theory “burst[s] the bubble” of the public interest model and
attempts to recast our critique of legislation and other law
creation with an understanding that even those with benign or
inherently good sounding motives or causes are nonetheless
seeking private interest gains.95
90 MAXWELL L. STEARNS & TODD J. ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS AND
APPLICATIONS IN LAW 46 (2009) (explaining rents and rent-seeking).
91 Andrew P. Morriss, Bruce Yandle & Andrew Dorchak, Choosing How to Regulate,
29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV . 179, 214 (2005) [hereinafter Morriss et al., Choosing] (discussing
the history of public interest theory).
92 Id. at 215.
93 James Buchanan, Politics Without Romance: A Sketch of Positive Public Choice
Theory and Its Normative Implications, in THE THEORY OF PUBLIC CHOICE -II 11 (James
Buchanan & Gordon Tullock eds., 1984) (explaining that the truths exposed by public
choice destroyed the romance of public interest theory).
94 STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 90, at 44–45 (contrasting the public interest and
public choice models).
95 Paul Boudreaux, Eminent Domain, Property Rights, and the Solution of
Representation Reinforcement, 83 D ENV. U. L. REV. 1, 18 (2005) (public choice theory
“burst the bubble” of the civic republic model by explaining that “[l]aws adopted
ostensibly to help the public are in reality the masked use of government to help one
group at the expense of others – be it business interests who are helped by regulation of
their competitors or outdoor enthusiasts aided by laws restricting private development in
parklands”).
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Public choice theory looks at the world of legislation and
other avenues of law creation as marketplaces for the production
of goods desired by interest groups. The law suppliers—usually
legislators but also including courts—have the ability to produce
such goods96 upon demand from interest groups and the interest
groups will pay to acquire the goods (so long as it is more efficient
than paying for the same result in an open marketplace without
the legislation).97
In corporate social responsibility, the expansionist interest
groups see their opposition, or competition, as the businesses
upon which they seek to impose higher standards. While the
expansionist lobby could negotiate in the private market with
businesses to encourage changes in behavior, such bargaining
would be costly. It may often be less expensive for advocacy
groups to obtain the same result—changes in corporate
behavior—by spending their budget on changing legal rules to
their advantage. This includes seeking legislation to advance
their interests, developing litigation strategies to create
liabilities for corporations, and the like.98 We should expect the
expansionist corporate social responsibility lobby’s resources will
be directed to the law making realm when achieving gains there
is less costly than bargaining for such gains.
Interest-group consumers of the laws supplied usually
benefit quite separate and apart from any concern over the
greater social welfare (even if that legislation is given a general
welfare spin in order to market to the public that legislation or
other legal outcome as a positive for the public good).99 When it
comes to information, interest groups have a leg up. Interest
groups are more savvy and experienced at controlling the flow of
information than individual citizens, and thus those interest
groups are able to manage the message so that the public and its
legislators have reason to support the legislation or other
changes in law that the interest group favors.100
96 Robert D. Tollison, The Economic Theory of Rent Seeking, 152 PUB. CHOICE 73, 80
(2012) [hereinafter Tollison, Economic Theory] (discussing the supply and demand of
legislation).
97 See, e.g., George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. &
MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971); Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VA. L. REV. 339
(1988).
98 See Rubin et al., supra note 8, at 295–96.
99 Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 227 (1986) [hereinafter
Macey, Public-Regarding] (“Interest group theory treats statutes as commodities that are
purchased by particular interest groups or coalitions of interest groups that outbid and
outmaneuver competing interest groups.”).
100 See NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN & SHIRLEY ELDER, INTERESTS GROUPS , LOBBYING AND
POLICYMAKING 75–76 (Robert L. Peabody ed., 1978).
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The idea is to obtain something of value by spending less on
the lobbying, litigating, and other payments needed to get that
something from the government than one would need to spend in
a free and openly competitive marketplace where they would
have to negotiate with other private parties to obtain that same
something of value.101 This process of “rent-seeking”102 is the
expenditure of resources to obtain this something of value—often
an alteration in legal status that directly props up the seeker’s
bargaining position but at other times some alteration that
simply knocks down a competitor’s status.103 A rational interest
group will invest in the cheapest alternative mechanism to
achieve their desired results.104 When working for legal change
becomes more expensive than seeking a private market
resolution, interest group behavior is channeled back again to
that private market.105 When one can obtain a rent—the positive
savings differential between the high cost of obtaining something
in the market and the lower cost of obtaining the same thing
through legal institutions—then the rational investor will seek
that rent.
For rent-seeking deals to succeed the public needs to be left
with the perception that the actions of legislators are public
minded and that the actions of courts are independent and free
from outside manipulation for private gains; and, the public must
be left with little reason to suspect the existence of
private-advantage deals that transfer wealth from individual
taxpayers.106 Quite often due to the concept of “masking,” despite
legislation or other alterations of legal rules having the effect of
promoting a specific interest group’s agenda (often at the expense
of the public), the face of the legislation or legal rule is designed
to make the public believe that it, the public, is the true
beneficiary of the law. As a result of such a belief, the public is

101 See generally Daniel A. Farber & Philip Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public
Choice, 65 TEX L. REV. 873 (1987).
102 Id.; see also generally Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies,
and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 224, 232 (1967); Tollison, Economic Theory, supra note 96, at 80
(describing rent-seeking).
103 STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 90, at 50 (defining rent-seeking as “meaning
affirmative lobbying efforts to secure beneficial legal protections against competition”).
104 Tollison, Economic Theory, supra note 96, at 80 (“[G]roups who can organize for
less than a dollar in order to obtain a dollar of benefits from legislation will be the
effective demanders of transfers.”).
105 STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 90, at 46 (“[A]n economic rent arises when an
economic activity, for example labor, earns a return that exceeds the opportunity cost of
the income-producing asset.”).
106 Morriss et al., Choosing, supra note 91, at 225 (“Politicians . . . seek to minimize
their own costs when acting on behalf of interest groups or the general public.”).
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less likely to question the law and light never shines on the less
scrupulous interest group bargain behind the mask.107
This masking concept is also sometimes referred to as a
curtain, cloak, or veil of legitimacy.108 Masking works to shield
interest group-motivated changes in the law from scrutiny
because it hides the costs of the activity behind a veil of a
seemingly positive goal. Masking plays a critical role in
rent-seeking’s successes,109 and corporate social responsibility
advocates are in a strong starting position given the comparative
“good versus evil” optics discussed in Part I.110 As Professor
Harry Hutchison has explained, “Properly understood, the
corporate social responsibility model allows some to exercise
their preferences at the expense of others while couching that
exercise in wonderful sounding language.”111
When such a mask is effective, of course, it diminishes
opposition and makes the rent-seeking successful because there
is little resistance to the legal movement or the change
achieved.112 In the end, rent-seeking processes are damaging and
dangerous because they result in misallocation of resources in

107 John O. McGinnis, The Bar Against Challenges to Employment Discrimination
Consent Decrees: A Public Choice Perspective, 54 LA. L. REV . 1507, 1530–31 (1994)
(explaining the means by which politicians can raise the information costs for those
opposing their actions by disguising the true objectives of their actions); Todd J. Zywicki,
Environmental Externalities and Political Externalities: The Political Economy of
Environmental Regulation and Reform, 73 TUL. L. REV. 845, 890 (1999) [hereinafter
Zywicki, Externalities] (discussing why the rational voter will have no incentive to spend
time or money to discover illegitimate wealth transfers and interest group deals).
108 See Rebecca M. Kysar, Listening to Congress: Earmark Rules and Statutory
Interpretation, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 519, 580 (2009) (discussing masking special interest
legislation); POLITICAL ENVIRONMENTALISM: GOING BEHIND THE G REEN CURTAIN (Terry L.
Anderson ed., 2000) (discussing the curtain behind which private interest deals hide);
Jonathan H. Adler, Rent Seeking Behind the Green Curtain, REG ., Fall 1996, at 26–34
(1996) (curtain concept); Scott Baker & Kimberly D. Krawiec, The Penalty Default Canon,
72 GEO. WASH . L. REV. 663, 678 (2004) (discussing a legislative public interest “cloak”);
Gregory C. Shaffer, How Business Shapes Law: A Socio-Legal Framework, 42 CONN. L.
REV. 147, 155 (2009) (“In some cases, ‘public interest’ statutes may serve as a facade,
providing a symbol of government concern while masking government inaction.”); Michael
Abramowicz & Thomas B. Colby, Notice-and-Comment Judicial Decisionmaking, 76 U.
CHI. L. REV. 965, 1013 (2009) (discussing rulemaking “charades”).
109 Macey, Public-Regarding, supra note 99, at 251.
110 See supra notes 63–82 and accompanying text.
111 Harry G. Hutchison, Director Primacy and Corporate Governance: Shareholder
Voting Rights Captured by the Accountability/Authority Paradigm, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
1111, 1135 n.141 (2005). Hutchison further explains that “[a]s thus understood, the
corporate social responsibility model is merely one of many conventional models of
corporate governance in which actors often exercise their own self-interest and as such,
the claim that this model exists in some counter-hegemonic sense remains highly
speculative.” Id.
112 Macey, Public-Regarding, supra note 99, at 232.
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society,113 forcing individuals to waste money seeking these “law”
goods and forcing their competitors to spend money opposing the
same. All the while wealth is being coercively transferred in
unnatural and unproductive ways.114
Lessons can be learned for the corporate social responsibility
mask from other seemingly wonderful terms like social justice,
environmental sustainability, or others infused with a sense of
the public good. Such terms readily attach themselves to
lawmaking efforts as part of the masking effort.115 Whether it is
labor unions, the plaintiffs’ bar, human rights organizations,
corporate social responsibility activists, or the like, these groups
are advancing a cause that appears as though it is in the “public
interest,” but public choice teaches us that is seldom the full
dynamic.
This Article started with the promise to make the case that
corporate social responsibility advocates are interest groups too,
and that is precisely the point here. While many people associate
interest groups or “special interests” only with businesses or
other overtly profit-driven enterprises, “social” or “public

113 Richard L. Hasen, Lobbying, Rent-Seeking, and the Constitution, 64 STAN. L. REV.
191, 232 (2012) (explaining the likely billions lost and other inefficiencies each year from
rent-seeking legislation); Tollison, Economic Theory, supra note 96, at 74 (explaining why
spending to obtain rent-seeking legislation produces nothing of value and diverts
resources from more important investments); see also Nicolas Loris, The Wind Production
Tax Credit and the Case for Ending All Energy Subsidies, 23 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F.
323, 327–28 (2013). Loris explains, by example, that “[t]he resources a banana producer
used for lobbying for banana tariffs or an extension of the banana tax credit could have
been spent actually growing and selling bananas. Rather than engaging in profit-seeking
behavior in the marketplace, the producer is engaging in rent-seeking behavior in the
political process.” Id. at 327.
114 Hasen, supra note 113, at 197 (discussing the diversion of funds by rent-seeking
and interest group legislation into nonproductive uses); Macey, Public-Regarding, supra
note 99, at 230 (explaining that most laws obtained through rent-seeking “enrich the few
at the expense of the many”). Empirical study reveals that these opportunity costs,
diverted resources, and negative effects on economic growth and entrepreneurship are
real:
Economist Russell Sobel of West Virginia University defines rent-seeking
as unproductive entrepreneurship. Political efforts made by rent-seeking
companies could have been channeled toward productive uses instead of
distorting economic activity. Sobel found that states that provide more political
preferences have higher levels of unproductive entrepreneurship and lower
levels of productive entrepreneurship, and therefore have slower economic
growth.
Loris, supra note 113, at 328 (citing Russell Sobel, Testing Baumol: Institutional Quality
and the Productivity of Entrepreneurship, 23 J. BUS. V ENTURING 641, 646 (2008)).
115 Georgette Chapman Poindexter, Land Hungry, 21 J.L. & POL. 293, 319 (2005)
(providing examples of when public interest-looking groups are often “purely self
interested actors” that rely on concepts like the “environment,” “social justice,” and
“preservation” as cover); see also, e.g., Donald J. Kochan, “Public Use” and the
Independent Judiciary: Condemnation in an Interest-Group Perspective, 3 TEX. REV. L. &
POL. 49 (1998) (discussing interest group influences and masking in eminent domain).
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interest” organizations seek to profit from the manipulation of
legal standards in much the same way as any other groups.
For example, Sheehan explains why non-governmental
organizations (NGOs)—the same groups that often appear as the
public face for corporate social responsibility initiatives—are
often perceived as public-interested but have the same
self-interested agenda as any other interest group:
NGOs have a political ideology. Most believe that the private sector
cannot solve environmental problems and that governments must
control economic decision-making to protect the environment. This
belief may be quite sincere, but it is also rooted in self-interest. Many
NGOs depend on governments for jobs, money and power. They seek
out grants and contracts from national governments and international
agencies. They also bask in the recognition they receive from public
agencies, which adds authority to their pronouncements and brings
their leaders prestige.116

NGOs get more funding if they have successes to market to
their membership, and with more funding comes greater job
security and growth of the organization.117 As I have described in
past work, the same motivations exist within human rights and
international law advocacy organizations, sometimes being the
very same groups that put corporate social responsibility at the
top of their agendas or at least align themselves with other
expansive corporate social responsibility groups.118
Environmentalism is a theme sometimes incorporated in
social responsibility, and, even when not cast directly as a
corporate social responsibility issue, it often has a very similar
tone as corporate social responsibility activism does in public
discussions. Professor Todd Zywicki has analyzed how
environmental public interest groups try to dominate the public
debate with high-sounding ideals when in fact they are seeking
private interest legal outcomes.119 The mask provided by such
116 JAMES M. SHEEHAN, GLOBAL GREENS 2 (1998). See also generally JEREMY RABKIN
& JAMES SHEEHAN, GLOBAL GREENS, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (1999).
117 Todd J. Zywicki, Baptists?: The Political Economy of Environmental Interest
Groups, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 315, 316–18 (2002) [hereinafter Zywicki, Baptists]
(“Their activities can be understood as being identical to those of any other interest group
– namely, the desire to use the coercive power of government to subsidize their personal
desires for greater environmental protection and to redistribute wealth and power to
themselves.”).
118 See Donald J. Kochan, The Political Economy of the Production of Customary
International Law: The Role of Non-governmental Organizations in U.S Courts, 22
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 240 (2004) [hereinafter Kochan, Political Economy].
119 Zywicki explains:
Environmentalists often claim that environmental activist groups and
environmental regulation is animated by the “public interest,” i.e., an
outpouring of “civic republicanism” that causes individuals to overcome their
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environmental groups and their seemingly noble intentions
provide a very effective diversion.120 Environmental groups—like
most corporate social responsibility advocates—claim that their
cause is bigger and better, more humane, and more basic than
profit. Yet, there is little cause to believe that they are using the
law in any more noble or just way than any business-based
interest group.121
These “public interest” groups have characteristics that
qualify them for scrutiny as interest groups no different from
corporate interest groups, military-industrial interest groups, or
others that often have that “special interest” label slapped on
them as a pejorative. Sargent explains that “[a]ssertions of
fairness, ‘the public interest,’ social justice, and equality thus are
often perceived within the law and economics tradition as masks
for the self-interest, as rhetorical dodges deflecting attention
from the play of conflicting interests.”122 These public
interest-labeled groups (including corporate social responsibility
groups) seek to maximize their budgets, maximize influence,
maximize membership, secure their jobs, and in the case of
corporate social responsibility sometimes directly effectuate
wealth transfers into their organizations or constituencies (e.g.,
from shareholders to stakeholders).
Such wealth transfers can occur through projects or
programs designed to provide aid and assistance to corporate
social responsibility stakeholders, payments of increased wages,
settlements in lawsuits, or other goods provided by the
corporations at the expense of their shareholders and in favor of

narrow self-interest and to support wide-ranging environmental regulatory
policies . . . . [A] brief review of the evidence suggests that the public interest
model has little descriptive accuracy with respect to the behavior of
environmental interest groups.
Zywicki, Baptists, supra note 117, at 325–26; see also Zywicki, Externalities, supra note
107, at 856–88 (explaining empirically the political economy of environmental interests
groups); POLITICAL ENVIRONMENTALISM, supra note 108; Adler, supra note 108, at 26;
Macey, Public-Regarding, supra note 99, at 232 n.46 (“Even regulations that have long
been thought to accomplish such worthy goals as improving the environment recently
have been shown to benefit special interests.”).
120 Zywicki, Baptists, supra note 117, at 336 (“[T]he stranglehold that environmental
lobbyists exercise over environmental policy-making is the result of the public perception
that these groups are, in fact, acting according to the public interest.”).
121 Id. at 349 (finding “little obvious difference between environmental activists who
want more for their projects, and farmers, defense contractors, or thousands of others who
use the political process to redistribute money from the public to the goals preferred by
their well-organized and influential interest groups”).
122 Mark A. Sargent, Utility, the Good and Civic Happiness: A Catholic Critique of
Law and Economics, 44 J. CATH. LEG. STUD. 35, 42 (2005); see also Stephen M.
Bainbridge, Law and Economics: An Apologia, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL
THOUGHT 208, 209 (Michael W. McConnell et al. eds., 2001).
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these outside stakeholders. Despite their public interest exterior,
there is no reason to treat corporate social responsibility groups
as anything different. They are trying to maximize their own
self-interest at the expense of others and will take advantage of
rent-seeking opportunities that are available to them.
In addition to having their own institutional interests as
advocacy groups in mind and profiting from lawmaking successes
by support and funding, these social policy groups engage in
remedy-seeking through rent-seeking. They see ills in the world
and believe that transfers of wealth accomplished through the
creation of legal rules are necessary to create a remedy for those
ills. They seek to impose new duties well beyond the limits that
would otherwise be imposed under our traditional notions of
liability for direct actions with proof of causation of harms
themselves traditionally defined and limited. Such groups would
rather obtain a benefit at a lower cost than these groups would
be required to pay if they were forced to bargain in a free market
for their preferred outcomes.123 Again, so long as the public
believes that their activities are public spirited, then their efforts
at making law will often move forward relatively unimpeded.
As discussed in the previous Part, corporate social
responsibility advocates can use market mechanisms, acquire
stock and try to influence corporations and effect change from the
inside through voting and corporate governance techniques,
bargain as an outsider for corporate change, seek legislation or
regulation to advance their interests, create liability schemes in
the courts, use derivative and direct shareholder lawsuits to alter
corporate behavior or to discipline corporate “misbehavior,” or
use other shareholder activism techniques. Within the
mechanisms listed, in all but the most benign voluntary
exchanges for, and purchases of, corporate social responsibility
outcomes where no changes in law would be necessary to
accomplish the ends, corporate social responsibility advocates
stand to benefit if they can achieve an alteration of law in favor
of their interests. Corporate social responsibility groups engage
in rent-seeking behavior to alter legal rules. They invest in
outcomes like stakeholder legislation, for example, in the same
way that a corporation looks to Congress for a tax advantage or
other corporate subsidy.
Where possible (and less expensive than private bargaining),
these corporate social responsibility groups will want to tip the

123 Zywicki, Baptists, supra note 117, at 349 (environmental rent-seeking helps
groups avoid costlier marketplace alternatives).
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law in their favor. There are incentives to make an investment in
the creation of law that will put the investor—here, the corporate
social responsibility advocates—in a strategically advantaged
position vis-à-vis competitors or others in the marketplace—here,
principally corporations—where transactions would otherwise be
free, on equal footing, and at arm’s length.
As mentioned earlier, public choice typically focuses on the
incentives for interest groups to invest in the production of
legislation beneficial to its interests and giving it a strategic
advantage—the creation of rents—not available in the private
marketplace.124 Similar analysis, however, can be applied to the
production of law generally. Public choice theory construed
broadly includes a description of rent-seeking investments in law
creation in any form to accomplish changes in legal status.125
Most specifically for purposes of this Article’s analysis,
interest groups will invest in the production of liability regimes
within the judicial system that similarly advantage the interest
group or disadvantage their competitors.126 So liability here
focuses less on altering firm governance standards than it does
on limiting the scope of acceptable/legal firm decisions.127 The
first success lies in creating the new duty with a corresponding
liability. The secondary benefit lies in the mere threat and
leverage that comes from having a new doctrine to wield against
an adversary. Where the mere existence of the threat of liability
regime can disadvantage the corporation at the bargaining table,
it is worthwhile for the interest group seeking to alter the
corporate behavior to invest in early stage developing of novel
liability theories.128 Seeking legal change to obtain valuable

124 See, e.g., Gordon Tullock, Rent Seeking, in 7 THE NEW PALGRAVE D ICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS 95 (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008).
125 Rubin et al., supra note 8, at 295–97 (noting that “[m]ost public choice analyses
stop with the passage of interest group legislation” but, drawing on empirical examples,
stressing the relevance of applying the same principles to incentives in using litigation for
rent-seeking ends).
126 Id. at 295 (“[I]nterest groups can sometimes use the common law litigation process
for benefit seeking. We provide a model of the decision by an interest group as to whether
to use the litigation process or traditional lobbying for the purpose of obtaining benefits
from government, and show that the model has empirical relevance.”).
127 See, e.g., ANDREW P. MORRISS ET AL., REGULATION BY LITIGATION (2009)
(describing several case studies where interest group outcomes were sought and achieved
through civil litigation models).
128 See Emanuela Carbonara & Francesco Parisi, Rent-Seeking and Litigation: The
Hidden Virtues of the Loser-Pays Rule 3 (Minn. Legal Studies Research Paper Series,
Research Paper No. 12-39, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2144800 (“When
parties litigate, they normally expend resources to improve their odds of winning . . . .
Economists describe such situations, where parties expend resources to improve their
share of (or probability of winning) fixed stake as ‘rent-seeking,’ which is how the law and
economics literature has predominantly analyzed litigation costs.”).
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leverage above and beyond their bargaining position without the
law provides rents to the corporate social responsibility interest
groups.129 The existence or nonexistence of a liability regime for
the behavior targeted for change affects the relative power of
expansionist interest groups to extract promises from corporation
to change behavior.130 Even if it is just in the investment in law
in order to create a threat of liability, it will make sense for an
interest group to invest in shifting the legal rules if the existence
of that threat can thereby alter the bargaining power—i.e., create
leverage.131
As civil litigation emerges to promote corporate social
responsibility through liability regimes, the remedy the plaintiffs’
attorneys and advocates are seeking often extends beyond relief
for the particular plaintiff in a case. The goal is bigger. 132
Additional goals include changing corporate behavior,133
promoting public policy,134 obtaining declarations of public
norms,135 sparking “institutional reform,”136 and the like.137 In
the ATS situation, for example, it involves the transformation of

129 See, e.g., Kal Raustiala, Commentary: Density and Conflict in International
Intellectual Property Law, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1021, 1034 (2007) (discussing as an
example the phenomena in intellectual property law involving “rent-seeking efforts by
producers, who try to use the lawmaking process to leverage their political strength in an
effort to segment and protect markets against increasing competition”).
130 Adler & Silverstein, supra note 87, at 20.
131 Rubin et al., supra note 8, at 303–08 (explaining the use of tort litigation, for
example, as interest-group motivated rent-seeking and the empirically proven
comparative advantages and successes of plaintiffs in this forum vis-à-vis business
interests).
132 Beth Stephens, Translating Filártiga: A Comparative and International Law
Analysis of Domestic Remedies for International Human Rights Violations, 27 YALE J.
INT’L L. 1, 14 (2002) (“This trend of public interest litigation predisposes the U.S. public,
judiciary, and legal advocates to view civil litigation a s a potential means to realize
large-scale policy goals and hold accountable perpetrators of egregious abuses, whether or
not such litigation results in an enforceable judgment.”).
133 Chimène I. Keitner, Conceptualizing Complicity in Alien Tort Cases, 60 HASTINGS
L.J. 61, 64 (2008) (“ATS cases against corporate defendants involve high stakes on both
sides. For victims, these cases offer an unusual chance to receive monetary compensation
for human rights violations, in addition to providing symbolic vindication and deterring
corporate involvement in internationally wrongful conduct.”).
134 Stephens, supra note 132, at 13 (“[I]n some public interest cases, ‘the subject
matter of the lawsuit is not a dispute between private individuals about private rights,
but a grievance about the operation of public policy.’”).
135 Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347,
2349 (1991).
136 Id. at 2347–48 (“[T]ransnational public law litigation seeks to vindicate public
rights and values through judicial remedies. In both settings, parties bring ‘public
actions,’ asking courts to declare and explicate public norms, often with the goal of
provoking institutional reform.”).
137 Stephens, supra note 132, at 14 (“[C]ivil litigation may lead to a full investigation
of the facts of an incident, identify the persons responsible, produce a public judgment of
that responsibility, and generate compensation for those harmed and punitive damages as
a sanction for the accused.”).
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a simple torts case into a case with a larger message and
meaning.138 Judgments can operate to negotiate issues in larger
public ideological conflicts.139 And the threats of liability can
operate to induce settlement—on both monetary and
action-based terms.
Corporations are motivated to negotiate with corporate social
responsibility advocates when there is a perceived risk to the
corporate brand or reputation.140 The interest groups are savvy at
focusing on what the corporations have to lose.141 Those
negotiations take on a much more serious character when the
advocates for social responsibility can legitimately threaten a
lawsuit with a real risk of liability if the corporation does not
change its behavior or otherwise settle with the advocacy
group.142 The corporations are willing to bargain as a
self-protection measure, trying to minimize the harm that could
be inflicted upon them if they do not bargain with the interest
group.143
138 See, e.g., Donald E. Childress III, The Alien Tort Statute, Federalism, and the Next
Wave of Transnational Litigation, 100 GEO. L.J. 709, 725 (2012) (stating that “it seems
that the real value of an ATS case is that it transforms a tort case into a human-rights
case,” although concluding it is not clear how effective this strategy has been for activist
plaintiffs).
139 Koh, supra note 135, at 2349 (“Even a judgment that the plaintiff cannot enforce
against the defendant in the rendering forum empowers the plaintiff by creating a
bargaining chip for use in other political fora.”).
140 Lisa M. Fairfax, Easier Said Than Done? A Corporate Law Theory for Actualizing
Social Responsibility Rhetoric, 59 FLA. L. REV . 771, 805–06 (2007) (“Recent literature
regarding corporate brands reveals that corporations . . . spend considerable effort
creating and protecting the corporate identity through the use of such techniques as
brands and slogans.”).
141 G. RICHARD SHELL , BARGAINING FOR A DVANTAGE: NEGOTIATION STRATEGIES FOR
REASONABLE PEOPLE 98 (2006) (discussing the strength of leverage when there is a
concrete risk of loss).
142 Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial
Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 418–19 (1973) [hereinafter Posner, Economic
Approach to Legal Procedure] (discussing subjective probability of prevailing and stakes
as elements in settlement calculus).
143 Fairfax, supra note 140, at 806–07. Fairfax explains that, “[r]eputation represents
a key component of corporate identity, and corporations aim to build a reputation of
trustworthiness . . . . The crux of recent literature is that once a corporation constructs an
identity, people within the corporation feel a responsibility to engage in actions that
protect and preserve that identity, thus fostering a quality reputation.” Id. (citing, inter
alia, KEVIN LANE KELLER, STRATEGIC BRAND MANAGEMENT: BUILDING, MEASURING, AND
MANAGING BRAND EQUITY 546 (2d ed. 2003) (discussing the “Science of Branding”)); see
also George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 24–25 (1984) (“[T]he loss of the case may damage the defendant’s public
reputation . . . . In situations of this nature, the dollar judgment sought by the plaintiff
may reflect only a small portion of the defendant’s total loss if the plaintiff wins.”); Shaun
Mulreed, Comment, Private Securities Litigation Reform Failure: How Scienter Has
Prevented the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 from Achieving Its Goals,
42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 779, 781 n.2 (2005) (“In considering whether to settle or litigate, a
corporation must weigh both the costs of settlement and potential brand injury against
expected results at trial.”).
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When faced with a lawsuit or the threat of a viable liability
claim, it is entirely possible that the judgment value is far
exceeded by the external effects of the litigation on the
corporation and the corporation’s own interests in preserving its
brand, image, reputation, customer base, investor interest, and
the like. Thus, corporations will often even settle when they
could win the substantive lawsuit but do not wish to incur the
incidental expense of the litigation and collateral damage along
the way. Moreover, if there is an ambiguous or uncertain risk,
which may very well be the case in newly developing liability
regimes, then the corporation may want to be risk averse—again
motivating settlement.
Interest groups will change course or divert their strategy
based on where their investment can return the greatest result.
The relative availability of liability mechanisms will have an
effect on resource allocation. Interest groups will invest in
litigation so long as the litigation (or cause of action) is viable. If
attractive causes of action exist, we can expect that an
expansionist interest group will invest more in litigation and less
in other avenues of attack. If courts are receptive to innovative
liability ideas, then too we should expect interest groups to invest
in developing a favorable liability doctrine complete with
bankrolling litigation efforts for the purpose of developing
precedent and dicta that constantly adds growing value to the
new scheme.
Because the viable cause of action is a very valuable and
powerful tool, we should expect that such groups will invest in
the development and expansion of liability doctrines that have a
high likelihood of becoming recognized as providing for legitimate
new claims. According to studies on settlement dynamics, there
is a dramatic shift in leverage between litigation competitors as
soon as a doctrine develops to the point that claims begin to
survive motions to dismiss.144 Soon thereafter the incentives for
corporate
defendants
to
settle
in
corporate
social
responsibility-driven litigation will increase.145 Consequently,
even an investment in a liability regime that only takes it just
144 Hillary A. Sale, Judges Who Settle, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 377, 386 (2011) (“Avoiding
damages and reputational harm and gaining preclusion all provide an incentive to
settle . . . . Even if the defendants believe that the allegations lack merit, when the
plaintiffs’ claims survive a motion to dismiss, the risk of a trial and the possibility of a bad
outcome increase.”).
145 Id.; see also A.C. Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Class
Actions with Exchanges as Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925, 952–53 (1999)
(“If the plaintiffs can withstand a motion to dismiss, defendants generally will find
settlement cheaper than litigation . . . . Any case plausible on the pleadings will have a
positive settlement value if only to avoid the costs of discovery and attorneys’ fees . . . .”).
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that far—to the point that the once novel theory is now accepted,
viable, and capable of surviving a motion to dismiss or summary
judgment—may be a very valuable use of an interest group’s
budget. Sometimes, the change in the status of the parties and
their positioning in negotiations are far more important than the
relative merits of the claims.
As the next Part will explain, the Alien Tort Statute is an
example of such an interest-group motivated development of a
liability doctrine. Lawsuits and their potential for monetary
awards were attractive to ATS expansionists, but they were not
the most advantageous outcome of the seeming acceptance of
corporate liability under the ATS. The doctrine that developed
provided leverage in negotiations with corporations and an
invigorated position when demanding behavioral change from
the corporation.146 The mere ability of corporate social
responsibility-minded plaintiffs to survive a motion to dismiss in
ATS suits against corporate defendants tipped the scales in a
manner that substantially increased the bargaining power of the
corporate social responsibility advocates. When causes of action
cannot be developed or where they are taken off the table—such
as with a Supreme Court case like Kiobel147 that essentially now
removes most of the ATS cases from the list of viable litigation
routes for gaining leverage against multinational corporations for
their activities outside the United States—we should expect such
interest groups to shift their resources to alternative points of
attack.
Despite the consequences of Kiobel narrowing to near nil the
effective and available ATS claims designed to alter corporate
behavior, the history of the ATS provides a useful study for (1)
examining the broad concept of rent-seeking beyond legislation;
(2) analyzing the effects of investment in lawmaking outcomes
including liability doctrines; and (3) demonstrating that
corporate social responsibility advocacy groups act like other
interest groups when seeking their preferred outcomes.
Investments in liability doctrines can be helpful in obtaining
valuable leverage for use in trying to change corporate behavior,
as one will see in the example that follows in the next Part. The
ATS corporate liability regime was designed, constructed, and
the product of investment by coalitions of interest groups aligned
by expansive corporate social responsibility preferences. The ATS
146 Beth Van Schaack, With All Deliberate Speed: Civil Human Rights Litigation as a
Tool for Social Change, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2305, 2329 (2004) (“As jurisprudence under the
ATCA has become more robust, the genuine threat of legal entitlement increasingly
presents the necessary predicate for settlement negotiations.”).
147 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).

Do Not Delete

452

3/18/2014 8:16 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 17:2

worked its way into becoming a major mechanization for using
litigation to affect changes in corporate conduct.
III. THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE AS A CASE STUDY IN CORPORATE
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY ADVOCATE-INVESTMENT IN THE
CREATION OF LIABILITY DOCTRINES
To illustrate some of this Article’s contentions regarding
interest group investment in corporate social responsibility law, I
will use the investments made in developing a liability regime for
multinational corporate operations through the vehicle of the
Alien Tort Statute (ATS) as a case study.148 The ATS grants the
federal district courts subject-matter jurisdiction over “any civil
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the
law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”149
The ATS liability revolution emerged around 1980, before
which almost no litigation had been brought under that
statute.150 After being “discovered,” the Alien Tort Statute
became one of the most important and controversial mechanisms
by which federal courts wrestled with and sometimes entertained
international law and human rights issues. Across the years,
most of the cases alleged that nation-states, state actors, and
even private individuals or corporations had actually committed,
or in complicity or conspiracy had been responsible for, violations
of international law.
148 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). For more complete discussions of the Alien Tort Statute,
its history, and its implications for law and policy, several other works by this Author
may be instructive. See generally Kochan, Mechanization, supra note 27; Donald J.
Kochan, Sovereignty and the American Courts at the Cocktail Party of International Law:
The Dangers of Domestic Judicial Invocations of Foreign and International Law, 29
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 507 (2006); Donald J. Kochan, Boyakasha, Fist to Fist: Respect and
the Philosophical Link with Reciprocity in International Law and Human Rights, 38 GEO .
WASH. INT’L. L. REV. 349 (2006); Donald J. Kochan, No Longer Little Known But Now a
Door Ajar: An Overview of the Evolving and Dangerous Role of the Alien Tort Statute in
Human Rights and International Law Jurisprudence, 8 CHAPMAN L. REV. 103 (2005)
[hereinafter Kochan, No Longer Little Known]; Kochan, Political Economy, supra note
118; Donald J. Kochan, Note, Constitutional Structure as a Limitation on the Scope of the
“Law of Nations” in the Alien Tort Claims Act, 31 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 153 (1998)
[hereinafter Kochan, Constitutional Structure]; see also Donald J. Kochan, After Burma:
Like the Massachusetts Law, the Alien Tort Claims Act Allows Improper Interference in
U.S. Foreign Policy, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 21, 2000, at 54.
149 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). For annotation based histories of ATS litigation, see
Russell G. Donaldson, Annotation, Construction and Application of Alien Tort Statute (28
U.S.C.A. § 1350), Providing for Federal Jurisdiction Over Alien’s Action for Tort
Committed in Violation of Law of Nations or Treaty of the United States, 116 A.L.R. FED.
387 (2005); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, & EDWARD H. COOPER, 14A
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3661.1 (Pocket Part 2005).
150 Judge Friendly has described the Act as an “old but little used section [that] is a
kind of legal Lohengrin; although it has been with us since the first Judiciary Act, no one
seems to know whence it came.” IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975)
(citation omitted) (holding fraud not a violation of international law).
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While ATS corporate social responsibility-based liability and
the reform-through-litigation strategy that led to its creation
were largely put to a stop when the U.S. Supreme Court decided
the 2013 case of Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,151 the
evolution of the ATS—including the investment in the
development of the liability regime by broad-minded corporate
social responsibility advocates and the leverage that those
advocates obtained during the years while the ATS seemed a
viable threat to corporations—is nonetheless instructive
regarding how investments in liability regimes operate
effectively for interest groups.
A quotation from a 2003 article in the Financial Times helps
illustrate the suitability of choosing the ATS as a case study for
an examination of the mechanics of corporate social
responsibility-based interest groups: “US plaintiffs’ lawyers have
revived a dormant 18th-century law and made it their chief
weapon in a 21st-century battle over corporate responsibility in
an age of globalisation.”152 That was undoubtedly true.153 From
1980 to 2013, the scope of ATS litigation grew extensively in
large part due to investments made in its creation. As it grew,
there was an ever-increasing risk that major liabilities could
attach for corporate business decisions and behaviors
accompanied by the expansion of enforceable duties corporations
owed to diverse groups of stakeholders worldwide.154 As one
author put it, the doctrine evolved “[i]n the best traditions of
American legal creativity,”155 as spurred by corporate social
133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
Patti Waldmeir, An Abuse of Power: US Courts Should Not Punish Companies for
Human Rights Violations Committed Overseas, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2003, at 12.
153 Williams, supra note 1, at 724–66 (discussing problems and possibilities of using
the ATS to achieve corporate social responsibility).
154 John B. Bellinger, III, The U.S. Can’t Be the World’s Court, WALL ST. J., May 27,
2009, at A19 (op-ed by attorney in Washington, D.C. and former legal advisor to the U.S.
Department of State) (“We may be on the verge of a new wave of legal actions against
U.S. and foreign corporations in American courts . . . . Litigation under the Alien Tort
Statute may force companies to modify their international activities in some cases,
although it rarely produces monetary awards for plaintiffs.”).
155 Waldmeir, supra note 152, at 12. As analysts watched the ATS evolution,
commentary was rich. For example, in commenting on the then-ongoing ATS suit against
Unocal, The Economist in its April 24, 1999 issue described the potential implications of
this new trend in tort litigation: “The next big test will be whether the Alien Tort Claims
Act can be used against companies as well as individuals.” Human-Rights Trials: To Sue
a Dictator, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 24, 1999, at 26. And, the authors prognosticated that if
companies began losing under the ATS, it could “provide a major headache for many
American companies operating abroad.” Id. When discussing an award against Serbian
leader Karadzic, an August 2000 Washington Post editorial called the new line of ATS
human rights’ cases “troubling” as “proceed[ing] under an ill-conceived but now wellaccepted reading of a 1789 law that . . . is a modern graft on a largely moribund statute;
international human rights law did not exist in the 18th century.” Lawsuits and Foreign
Policy, WASH. POST, Aug. 12, 2000, at A20. In November 2002, it was opined in the
151
152
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responsibility advocates generally along with human rights
groups, labor organizations, the plaintiffs’ bar as a strong
supporter with its own financial interests,156 and others aligned
with interests in developing new liability schemes.
Signs of the synergies between the causes favoring
expanding ATS liability doctrines and those seeking greater
corporate social responsibility were readily apparent as the law
progressed to accept an ever-growing role for the ATS. One labor
activist explained that the ATS was viewed within these groups
as a “vital tool for preventing corporations from violating
fundamental human rights.”157 A Corporate Legal Times headline
in 2002 put the reputational leverage issue front and center,
reading “No Longer Satisfied With Destroying the Reputations of
Corporations That Get Entangled in Human Rights Abuses
Overseas, Activist Groups are Seeking Retribution in U.S.
Courts.”158 One scholar opined that the ATS “cases should be
regarded as one element in a wide spectrum of attempts to tame
corporate behavior by inventing new global regulatory
regimes.”159 There was active investment by corporate social
responsibility-aligned advocacy groups in the creation of a legal

Financial Times that the ATS jurisprudential trend presented a “danger that the US
judicial system will become the world’s civil court of first resort . . . .” Thomas Niles, The
Very Long Arm of American Law, F IN. TIMES , Nov. 6, 2002, at 15. In yet another article in
2004, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce was quoted as characterizing the emerging ATS
suits as “‘global forum shopping,’ in which foreigners resort to U.S. courts, with their
favorable class action and discovery rules, to litigate over alleged human rights abuses
overseas by U.S. corporations. ‘The U.S. is increasingly becoming the jurisdiction of choice
for opportunistic foreign plaintiffs,’ says Chamber President Thomas Donohue.” Tony
Mauro, Justices Debate Alien Tort Law, LEGAL TIMES , April 5, 2004, at 8.
156 Van Schaack, supra note 146, at 2314 (“As ATCA jurisprudence became more
established and courts confirmed that corporations could be sued for human rights
abuses, the statute was ‘discovered’ by plaintiff-side lawyers . . . .”). Cf. Richard A.
Epstein, The Political Economy of Product Liability Reform, 78 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS &
PROC.) 311, 313 (1988). As Epstein has observed, when lawyers are in the mix in tort
suits, both the plaintiffs’ and defendants’ bar will perpetuate expanded tort liabilities:
Obviously, the plaintiff’s bar has a vital interest in preserving that system of
laws which maximizes its own welfare. Less obviously, perhaps, the
defendant’s bar has closely parallel interests. No defendant lawyer has ever
made substantial sums of money by being able to win a summary judgment
(i.e., judgment without the need for trial) for its clients.
Id.
157 TERRY COLLINGSWORTH, INT ’L LABOR RIGHTS FUND, THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT
– A V ITAL TOOL FOR PREVENTING CORPORATIONS FROM VIOLATING FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
(2003), available at http://lrights.igc.org/publications/ATCA.pdf.
158 See Robert Vosper, Conduct Unbecoming; No Longer Satisfied With Destroying the
Reputations of Corporations That Get Entangled in Human Rights Abuses Overseas,
Activist Groups are Seeking Retribution in U.S. Courts, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, October
2002, at 35.
159 Ronen Shamir, Between Self-Regulation and the Alien Tort Claims Act: On the
Contested Concept of Corporate Social Responsibility, 38 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 635, 643
(2004).
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liability regime that could be utilized to achieve not just
judgments but also substantial leverage through an alteration of
the relative legal rights between two competitors—corporations
seeking profit-maximization for their shareholders on the one
hand and stakeholders on the other side wanting instead for
corporate expenditures to be made to advance social interests
and desiring corporate profits to be shared with those claiming
an entitlement to remedies for some broad concept of harm
allegedly visited upon them by corporate behavior.
The ATS provided a means by which the soft ideals of human
rights and other international law activists could be transformed
into hard legal requirements.160 As such, they and other
corporate social responsibility advocates and like-minded
activists invested in the development of ATS litigation.161 Their
investments in early litigation brought returns as broader and
broader precedents developed and liability under the ATS started
to become more realistic and substantial, or at least was
perceived as such.
The remainder of this Part will provide further background
on the ATS and explain the ATS evolution as a way of describing
the process of interest group investment in new liability
doctrines. That analysis will include a description of the
economic benefits associated with purchasing, in effect, a stick
from the law’s liability-creating tort function to gain an
advantaged position that can be used to beat down a corporation
that, before the creation of the new doctrines, was in a more
favorable legal bargaining position with fewer recognized legal
duties.
In the case of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala in 1980, the ATS
emerged from non-use and the evolution of ATS litigation
began.162 There, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
held that suits based on customary international law for human
rights abuses could be pursued under the ATS.163 This opened
the door for several cases against numerous state actors from
rather oppressive regimes. It was clear that those involved in
early ATS litigation were in fact investing in the development of

160 Van Schaack, supra note 146, at 2335 (discussing using the ATS to “transform the
abstract and at times hortatory rights in the various international declarations, covenants
and treaties into enforceable legal claims” with more concrete status).
161 Id. at 2313 (“The first generation of individual ATCA-style actions was initiated
by lawyers affiliated with nonprofit human rights organizations, or lawyers working pro
bono, who were inspired by the tradition of using legal tools to advance morality-driven
goals.”).
162 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980).
163 Id.
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an expansive doctrine, understanding that the effective
development of a new liability scheme must take baby steps, 164
establishing precedent that gradually expands.165 Professor Beth
Stephens has described the civil human rights litigation model
witnessed in the ATS cases as involving a strategy of precedent
creation and expansion:
Civil litigation in the United States . . . has long been used as a
means of promoting social reform . . . . In the United States, we are
generally comfortable with the concept that lawsuits seek remedies
designed with an eye to the future . . . .
....
U.S. commentators have explained at length the benefits that civil
litigation offers to the victim, to the human rights movement, and to
society—even litigation that does not result in actual payment of the
damages awarded. Where the legal theories are novel or untested, a
civil lawsuit may seek first to obtain a judicial recognition of the rule
of law, a precedent that can then be used to influence future policies
and as a basis for future litigation.166

Similarly, Professor Harold Koh has discussed the strategic
importance of transnational public law litigation beyond
particular cases and extending to the creation of precedent and
other “prospective aim[s] as well.”167 These aims include “to
provoke judicial articulation of a norm of transnational law, with
an eye toward using that declaration to promote a political
settlement in which both governmental and nongovernmental
entities will participate.”168 Koh has further emphasized, after
discussing the early ATS cases, that “transnational public law
litigation is characterized by . . . the litigants’ strategic
awareness of the transportability of those norms to other
domestic and international fora for use in judicial interpretation
or political bargaining . . . .”169 While relief in a particular case is
not irrelevant, the prospective benefits from “building” law for
use in, and “transporting” precedent to, future cases and as

164 Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347,
2366 (1991) (discussing the first major ATS case Filartiga and explaining that in that
case “transnational public law litigants finally found their Brown v. Board of Education”);
165 See, e.g., Vincy Fon, Francesco Parisi & Ben Depoorter, Litigation, Judicial PathDependence, and Legal Change, 20 EUR. J. L. & ECON. 43, 44 (2005) (“The model of path
dependence in the law suggests the rate of recognition of legal claims brought by plaintiffs
in past cases affects the state of the law in the future.”).
166 Stephens, supra note 132, at 13–14 (emphasis added).
167 Koh, supra note 135, at 2349.
168 Id.
169 Id. at 2371.
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leverage in bargaining often seemed to be a fundamental
objective in the ATS cases.170
Many of the earliest ATS cases against state actor
defendants resulted in default judgments in favor of the
plaintiffs. With little party opposition and often gruesome
allegations, receptive courts began issuing judgments
accompanied by broadly worded interpretations of the scope of
the ATS. These cases seemingly served only a symbolic function
with limited effect as judgments were seldom collected.171 In
essence, these awards could be characterized as a “judgments as
social commentary” approach.172
But it was also a well-orchestrated campaign to build up the
ATS early on with easy cases followed by later application to new
situations and new defendants (with deeper pockets and who
were more likely to offer something of value to the plaintiffs to
see the litigation go away).173 As explained above, this playbook
is well known in the evolution of tort law and manifest in public
international law litigation as well.
These cases were necessary to create a foundation for a
bigger target down the road—corporations. Many of the corporate
social
responsibility-associated
interest
groups
suing
corporations toward the end of the ATS evolution were on the
ground from the start, remedy-seeking for alleged harms
occurring around the world and looking for someone to hold
responsible.
Moreover, it is important to note that while the public law
litigators were building precedent, there were few forces working
against them. In the early years, there was no countervailing
interest-group force balancing the zealous expansionist group

170 Keitner, supra note 133, at 64 (“[C]orporate ATS litigation has become a
battleground in broader struggles over the role of tort litigation in regulating corporate
behavior . . . .”).
171 Lauren A. Dellinger, Corporate Social Responsibility: A Multifaceted Tool to Avoid
Alien Tort Claims Act Litigation While Simultaneously Building a Better Business
Reputation, 40 CAL. W. INT ’L L.J. 55, 91 (2009) (ATS “litigation has largely been
unsuccessful in the sense that no solid judgments against these corporations have been
entered. . . . In the past, individuals have used the ATS merely to obtain a sense of justice,
realizing that the monetary award may never come.”).
172 A Washington Post editorial raised concerns about the ATS as it was expanding,
especially after seeing judgments pursued solely for symbolic effect. That editorial
cautioned that “[y]ou don’t have to be indifferent to human rights abuses to have
misgivings about this reading [of the ATS], because it creates troubling problems for
democratic government and permits the courts to interfere excessively in the conduct of
foreign policy.” Old Law, New Questions, WASH. POST, July 20, 2004, at A16.
173 Van Schaack, supra note 146, at 2313 (“At the outset, these legal pioneers sought
to establish the ATCA as a tool for the enforcement of human rights norms and to gain
judicial elaboration of the scope of those norms.”).
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investment in ATS litigation. There was no check on the forward
progress of the doctrinal evolution. There was, as explained
above, little opposition in the lawsuits themselves and few
interest groups outside the litigation saw any danger to the
doctrinal progress.174 Corporations did not see the coming threat
and did not intervene in the ATS development.175 Indeed, even
the academy was lopsided in favor of the expansion.176 Academics
were in large part the intellectual driving force behind the
beginnings of the ATS revolution and, of those that wrote about
the ATS at all, the majority of scholars favored its expansion.177
It was not until the late 1990s that any scholarly works focused
on refuting the merits and wisdom of the ATS evolution in any
substantial and critical manner.178
The development of the new liability doctrines under the
ATS was in the finest traditions of rent-seeking too. Activists
were seeking to create a law that would place them in a position
of dominance over the legal rights of others, ultimately allowing
them to obtain outcomes at a lower cost than if they were
required to bargain privately for such a reallocation of duties and
obligations.
Another major step in the ATS evolution occurred in the
1995 Kadic v. Karadžic case, in which the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit held that quasi-public and even private
actors might be bound by customary international law for certain
egregious violations and could be sued under the ATS.179 This

174 See Kochan, No Longer Little Known, supra note 148, at 108 n.20 (discussing the
lack of corporate interest, for example, even in the late 1990s).
175 Id. at 107–08.
176 See HAROLD HONGJU KOH, TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS
35 (2008) (noting that Filartiga “triggered a wave of academic scholarship and more than
a quarter-century of human rights litigation in U.S. courts”); see also David Fontana, The
Rise and Fall of Comparative Constitutional Law in the Postwar Era, 36 YALE J. INT’L L.
1, 27–30 (2011) (“The law professors who revitalized international law during this time [in
the late 1970s and early 1980s before and after Filartiga] came from a profession more
and more interested in international law—in particular as a source for American federal
litigation.”).
177 See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Judicial Imperialism, WALL ST. J., June 17, 2003, at A16
(discussing ATS cases as part of the effort toward “the enactment of world-wide law by an
unholy alliance of imperialistic judges and a leftish cadre of international law
professors”); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 749–50 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“The notion that a law of nations, redefined to mean the consensus of states on any
subject, can be used by a private citizen to control a sovereign’s treatment of its own
citizens within its own territory is a 20th-century invention of internationalist law
professors and human-rights advocates.”) (emphasis in original).
178 My 1998 student note was one of the very first articles providing any substantial
and concentrated critique of the ATS specifically. See Kochan, Constitutional Structure,
supra note 148.
179 Kadic v. Karadžic, 70 F.3d 232, 239–44 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1005
(1996).
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was the next return on the ATS-promoters’ investment,
expanding the scope of defendants just a little more and creating
the necessary precedential prelude to finding corporate liability
under the ATS. And that is precisely what came next.
ATS liability expanded next in the late-1990s with successes
in bringing suits (and surviving motions to dismiss) against
corporate defendants. The 1997 Doe I v. Unocal case, where the
corporate-defendant ATS suit had its first major validation, was
trailblazing.180 A federal district court held that Unocal, a private
corporation, was subject to ATS jurisdiction for alleged human
rights abuses abroad.181 After that 1997 decision, it was open
season for the use of the ATS against corporations to try to
advance the agendas of a variety of corporate social
responsibility-minded interest groups.
Between 1997 and 2013, scores of lawsuits were filed against
corporations under the ATS.182 The theories also broadened
over time, sometimes alleging corporate liability on
aiding-and-abetting or vicarious liability theories in addition to
some claiming that international law was broad enough to
impose direct liability for corporate actions independent of the
acts of the ruling regimes where they operate.183
Activists had faced somewhat incomplete and unsatisfactory
victories against nation states or foreign leaders in early ATS
litigation. Barriers to “success” for plaintiffs in the early ATS
suits included sovereign immunity for state actors, forum non
conveniens dismissals, cases dismissed on political question or
act of state doctrine defenses, and problems obtaining personal
jurisdiction over some state actor defendants, along with other
prudential rules that insulated many nations or state actors from
ATS review. On top of these barriers, even when plaintiffs were
successful in proceeding to trial against a state actor ATS
defendant, these parties were often judgment proof or their
assets were inaccessible for collection.

Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 963 F.Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
Id. at 892, 898 (upholding subject matter jurisdiction under ATS based on
allegations that an American oil company, acting in concert with the Burmese
government, committed various civil and human rights abuses), aff’d in part & rev’d in
part, 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), and rehearing en banc granted, opinion vacated by Doe
v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003).
182 For a summary of major pre-Kiobel ATS cases, see Lee G. Dunst, Human Rights
Overseas: Courts Have Enforced Strict Gatekeeping Function in Dismissing Suits Under
the Alien Tort Claims Act, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 26, 2009, at S6. See also generally MICHAEL
KOEBELE, CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY UNDER THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE (2009); RALPH G.
STEINHARDT & ANTHONY D’AMATO, THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT: AN ANALYTICAL
ANTHOLOGY (1999).
183 See generally KOEBELE, supra note 182.
180
181
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Targeting corporations in ATS suits overcame several
problems for plaintiffs. Corporate ATS suits were in part a
response to the dissatisfaction regarding the inability to recover
either monetary judgments or true justice against state actors in
these early cases.184 Corporations do not enjoy sovereign
immunity and have a more difficult time using the other shields
mentioned above. Thus, in many cases, jurisdictional obstacles to
suit, while keeping foreign nations and leaders out of the
defendant’s chair, could be avoided when suing a corporation.
The next milestone in the ATS evolution came with the 2004
decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.185 That case marked the
first time that the U.S. Supreme Court had discussed the ATS,
although even in Sosa the Court offered only minimal guidance
as to its scope.186 The Sosa decision did little to disrupt the
upward liability trend in the ATS cases and did not foreclose
corporate ATS suits.187
The ATS suits were at first novel and extraordinary. By
2009, however, at least one writer was arguing that “[t]hese
lawsuits have become so routine . . . they’ve barely caused a
ripple in the news cycle.”188 Although perhaps overstated,
another author even observed in 2009 that ATS suits had
become “commonplace for companies with international
operations . . . .”189 ATS suits were clearly aimed at inducing
changes in corporate behavior, and the number of cases steadily
rose as the corporate ATS suit became perceived as an
increasingly legitimate means of grievance, a beneficial means of
remedy-seeking, and an acceptable mechanism for holding
corporations to a higher standard of care with a broader base of
constituent stakeholder interests owed some duties by those
corporations.190

184 Nathan Koppel, Arcane Law Brings Conflicts From Overseas to U.S. Courts, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 27, 2009, at A11 (“Thomas Niles, a former U.S. ambassador to Canada and
Greece who is now the vice chairman of the United States Council for International
Business, a pro-business group, says corporations are being used unfairly as a surrogate
for foreign governments in these cases. ‘You can’t sue the government of Nigeria or South
Africa because of sovereign immunity, so who are you going to sue? Companies, and they
are sued essentially for being’ in countries where human-rights violations occur.”).
185 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
186 See generally Kochan, No Longer Little Known, supra note 148.
187 Id.
188 Steven Dudley, The Trials and Errors of Tort Cases: Lawsuits Against
Multinationals for Abuses Abroad may be Losing Steam, MIAMI HERALD, June 15, 2009, at
G12 (recognizing there were “more than 30 [corporate ATS] suits around the country” at
the time of his article).
189 See Dunst, supra note 182, at S6.
190 Koppel, supra note 184, at A11. As a Wall Street Journal reporter explained,
“Victims of human-rights abuses around the world increasingly are seeking justice
American style – by filing lawsuits against deep-pocketed defendants. Both sides agree on
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As the ATS cases had progressed, the ATS activists pushed
increasingly expansive theories of the ATS’s scope, often with
success. The first wave of ATS litigation came in the 1980s with
cases that were largely based on sympathetic facts and
allegations of unacceptable atrocities with allegations of
relatively direct causation by ruthless and despicable defendants.
This made these “easy” cases to decide and made the opinions in
the cases susceptible to relatively far-reaching statements
regarding the purpose and reach of the ATS. Precedent under the
ATS was developing, and both precedent and dicta could always
be manipulated in the next case to slowly expand the accepted
and recognized reach of the ATS and increase the pool of
defendants. Every expansion of the liability doctrine was a
stepping-stone to yet another stage of expansion.
Corporations eventually recognized the threat, as evidenced
by the liability-management techniques engaged in by ATS
defense attorneys and public relations managers in the public
square in the late 2000s. Several of these reputation managers
and liability limiters published articles in the news media
regarding the cost of ATS litigation to corporations and the
litigation risks involved.191 Some of these articles and op-eds read
with the tone of client development letters, but they are
nonetheless an instructive perspective from the front lines
reflecting at least the perceived threat. These same defense
attorneys later trumpeted the Kiobel decision as a glorious end to
the dangerous ATS litigation scheme against corporations.192
Activist litigators had “seized the opportunity” to begin
litigating against corporations under the ATS because
corporations were much more attractive targets than early ATS
defendants.193 There was also a higher probability of settling
one thing: Courts increasingly are willing to consider alien-tort suits and to force
companies to answer for their behavior overseas.” Id. (emphasis added).
191 For a sampling of these articles, see J. Russell Jackson, Alien Tort Claims Act
Cases Keep Coming: Lawsuits by Plaintiffs From All Over the World Present Major Risks
for Companies Doing Business Abroad, NAT ’L L.J., Sept. 14, 2009, at 28 (author “a partner
in the mass torts group at New York’s Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, which
represents defendants in Alien Tort Claims Act cases”); Jordan Cowman, The Alien Tort
Statute – Corporate Social Responsibility Takes On a New Meaning, MONDAQ, Aug. 11,
2009 (author a partner in the Dallas office of Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP);
Jonathan Drimmer & Jennifer Millerwise Dyck, Human Rights Threat Matrix: Corporate
Responsibility Through a Legal Lens, PR NEWS, Apr. 20, 2009, at 7 (authors are a partner
of Steptoe and Johnson L.L.P, and a VP of APCO Worldwide, respectively).
192 See, e.g., Andrew Pincus, Is the Alien Tort a Zombie Doctrine? Andrew Pincus
Responds, LITIGATION DAILY, April 29, 2013, http://www.americanlawyer.com/
digestTAL.jsp?id=1202597980026&Is_the_Alien_Tort_a_Zombie_Doctrine_Andrew_Pincu
s_Responds (a perspective of the ATS evolution from beginning to end by one of the
lawyers for corporate defendants).
193 Kirschner explains:
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cases with positive results for the plaintiffs, judged by a variety
of metrics (including bargaining for changed behaviors) in
addition to monetary relief.194
True to corporate social responsibility form, many ATS suits
seek more than monetary damages in their demands for relief.195
For example, “plaintiffs in the corporate cases have increasingly
sought judicial directives governing [Multinational Corporations’]
foreign investment policies, relations with their host
governments, offshore production arrangements, project security
measures, environmental policies, and labor relations.”196 It is
not surprising then that these same plaintiffs seek more than
money in settlement negotiations including reforms in corporate
behaviors.197
While there is an emphasis in some public civil litigation for
obtaining damages for the particular plaintiff in the case, most
often these cases are motivated by something more. In
transnational tort litigation, for example, Koh explains that,
“although transnational public law plaintiffs routinely request
retrospective damages or even prospective injunctive relief, their
broader strategic goals are often served by a declaratory or
default judgment announcing that a transnational norm has
been violated.”198 It is the development of precedent that has
broader utility in terms of its advancement of a cause and a
promoter’s position in negotiations with adversaries of the cause.
Redressing the plaintiff’s injury is often a secondary goal in
corporate social responsibility advocacy-generated litigation.199
This is not universally true for all involved—some plaintiffs’

Corporations provide easier targets for ATS claims than individuals or
repressive regimes, and litigators seized the opportunity. The 2001 Doe v.
Unocal case offered to charge them with complicity in human rights abuses.
Suits against corporations have reached actions taken by many individuals
that only collectively amount to illegalities. Sovereign immunity has not
protected corporations as it has governments. Most large corporations have
maintained permanent presences within the United States, making it possible
to establish personal jurisdiction over them. Corporations also have had more
substantial recoverable assets and stronger incentives to settle claims to avoid
negative publicity than other defendants.
Jodie A. Kirshner, Why Is the U.S. Abdicating the Policing of Multinational Corporations
to Europe?: Extraterritoriality, Sovereignty, and the Alien Tort Statute, 30 BERKLEY J.
INT’L L. 259, 272–73 (2012).
194 Id.
195 Van Schaack, supra note 146, at 2328.
196 Id.
197 Id.
198 Koh, supra note 135, at 2349.
199 See, e.g., Van Schaack, supra note 146, at 2313 (speaking of the ATS cases and
stating that “[a]lthough ostensibly tort disputes seeking retrospective relief, obtai ning an
executable judgment was often a secondary goal of this litigation.”).
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lawyers are in it for a payday and want to maximize the
monetary judgment to maximize their contingency fee and their
demands in corporate social responsibility liability litigation have
complicated settlements aimed at achieving more grand
reform-based outcomes.200 Nonetheless, when a reform agenda
dominates the litigation strategy, one can expect that the
litigation will be aimed at obtaining some concessions from a
corporation that could not have been extracted absent the
existence of the liability regime.
ATS advocates began to utilize the tool created by their
investment in the creation of new law, leveraging the threat of
ATS liability to induce corporations to agree to change conduct or
pay monetary settlements. Without the ATS, the advocates’ legal
position was weaker and they would have been required to “pay”
the corporations to change. Stated another way, without the
duties even just potentially imposed by the ATS, the corporations
could stand on their then-existing legal position where a payment
to the corporate social interest group would feel less compulsory
(and, consequently, what the corporation would be willing to pay
to avoid action by the advocacy group would have been less as
well).201
In discussing why, in part, there are so few judicial opinions
on the ATS, the Second Circuit in Kiobel explained that:
Such civil lawsuits, alleging heinous crimes condemned by
customary international law, often involve a variety of issues unique
to ATS litigation, not least the fact that the events took place abroad
and in troubled or chaotic circumstances. The resulting complexity
and uncertainty—combined with the fact that juries hearing ATS
claims are capable of awarding multibillion-dollar verdicts—has led
many defendants to settle ATS claims prior to trial. 202

Simply recognizing the legitimacy of ATS corporate
defendant litigation changes the power dynamic between the
parties.

200 Id. at 2314–15 (discussing the complexity of motivations in ATS lawsuits
especially once the plaintiffs’ bar started joining in with more materialistic goals than
some of the reform-minded advocates).
201 As Van Schaack explains:
Even short of a full settlement, the commencement of litigation may make
possible discussions between parties that were foreclosed by power inequalities
in place prior to the filing of suit. Indeed, the very filing of the suit can provide
a “foot in the door” to communicate with a defendant corporation that may
have otherwise dismissed the demands of victims and activists.
Van Schaack, supra note 146, at 2330.
202 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 116 (2010) (citations omitted).
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Leverage is very powerful.203 As G. Richard Shell explains,
“[l]everage is your power not just to reach agreement, but to
obtain an agreement on your own terms.”204 Indeed, it changes
the stakes.205 “Research has shown that, with leverage, even an
average negotiator will do pretty well while without leverage
only highly skilled bargainers achieve their goals. The party with
leverage is confident; the party without it is usually nervous and
uncertain.”206
A special report in The Economist studied the ATS evolution
and concluded that the merits of the cases were almost a side
issue, with the remedy-seeking settlement and leverage
dynamics at the center of the stage:
Most of the rhetoric on CSR may be about doing the right thing
and trumping competitors, but much of the reality is plain risk
management. It involves limiting the damage to the brand and the
bottom line that can be inflicted by a bad press and consumer
boycotts, as well as dealing with the threat of legal action. In America,
the legal instrument of choice . . . is the Alien Tort Claims Act . . . .
Even if it does not get as far as a trial, this can be embarrassing and
costly for companies.207

Williams similarly opined that the merits of these corporate
ATS cases were not nearly as important as the power brought by
the mere legal legitimacy of the lawsuits—“they represent a form
of leverage and a forum for leverage being newly brought to bear
on global corporate social responsibility issues.”208 Most ATS
suits against corporations were weak on the merits and instead
were useful as a mechanism to get corporations to settle, beating
the corporations down with the prospect of protracted and
expensive litigation, and ultimately obtain something valuable
203 SHELL, supra note 141, at 103 (“Threat leverage gets people’s attention because,
as astute negotiators have known for centuries and psychologists have repeatedly proven,
potential losses loom larger in the human mind than do equivalent gains.”).
204 Id. at 90.
205 Id. at 98 (“To gain real leverage, you must eventually persuade the other party
that he or she has something concrete to lose in the transaction if the deal falls through.”).
206 Id. at 90.
207 A Special Report on Corporate Social Responsibility: A Stitch in Time, ECONOMIST,
January 19, 2008, at 12; see also Dudley, supra note 188, at G12. In his reporting, Dudley
observed that “corporate watchdog groups say the lawsuits have helped usher in a new
era of corporate social responsibility . . . .” Id. He continued to report the statement from
Pam Muckosy, the research manager for the London-based Ethical Corporation Institute,
that “‘Sometimes companies pursue CSR in order to improve their international
reputation and be a good “global citizen,” . . . Other times, it’s about securing a local
“license to operate.” Increasingly, it seems to be about minimizing legal risks.’” Id.
208 Williams, supra note 1, at 772; see also Childress, supra note 138, at 725–26
(2012) (“[I]t is arguable that modern uses of the ATS against corporations” result in part
because of the “signaling value that is offered when bringing suit against a corporation for
alleged violations of international law” and “brand damage while gaining significant
publicity in hopes of both encouraging policy change and a monetary settlement.”).
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for the plaintiff advocates (i.e., a share of some of their profits
either directly or through forcing corporate expenditures on
projects of value to the plaintiff corporate social responsibility
group).209 Despite these often weak claims, the gains from
settlement for the plaintiffs and the corporate social
responsibility causes they championed were often substantial—
either in dollar terms210 or in costly alterations in behavior
agreed to by a corporation to settle a case.211
The lawsuit-as-settlement-leverage litigation model was
clearly utilized in the ATS corporate defendant suits. Douglas
Branson, for example, has claimed that “[t]he ultimate value of
ATS lawsuits, or some of them, is not to hold the multinational
parent liable, or to force the multinational to undergo a long and
complicated trial. The ultimate objective should be to send a
message to corporate boardrooms and to obtain a recovery for
persons who have suffered very real harms.”212 That messaging
process, according to Branson, meant these ATS suits could be
used to scare corporations into settlements or otherwise into
making decisions that accomplish changes in behavior consistent
with meeting the demands of the corporate social
responsibility-oriented interest groups represented by the
plaintiffs in these cases.213 As explained in my earlier work:

209 Gary C. Hufbauer, Why Shouldn’t Corporations Be Liable Under the ATS?, 43
GEO. J. INT’L L. 1009, 1010 (2012) (“Many ATS suits are class actions that entail years of
litigation, extensive discovery of corporate records, and damage to the corporation’s
reputation. Such suits are mostly an effort by the plaintiffs to force a corporate settlement
regardless of the underlying merits.”); David Scheffer & Caroline Kaeb, The Five Levels of
CSR Compliance: The Resiliency of Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute and
the Case for a Counterattack Strategy in Compliance Theory, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 334,
372 (2011) (“Corporations remain exposed to the risks of diminished reputation and to the
costs of legal settlements that offer attractive alternatives to prolonged litigation under
the ATS, depending on its current fate before the federal courts.”).
210 See Dunst, supra note 182, at S6 (discussing the fifteen million dollar settlement
by Shell in one case and concluding that “the Shell settlement certainly may incentivize
plaintiffs to file additional claims under the act in the future”); Unocal Settles Rights
Suits in Myanmar, N.Y. T IMES, Dec. 14, 2004, at C6; Catherine Rampell, Yahoo Settles
With Chinese Families, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 2007, at D4; see also Jonathan Drimmer,
Resurrection Ecology and the Evolution of the Corporate Alien Tort Movement, 43 GEO. J.
INT’L L. 989, 998 (2012) (“While for years federal courts routinely dismissed corporate
ATS cases, plaintiffs have gained a greater frequency of settlements and victories,” and
“[s]everal corporate ATS cases have settled for well over ten million dollars.”); Van
Schaack, supra note 146, at 2239 (discussing a variety of settlements induced by ATS
suits).
211 Jeffrey A. Van Detta, Politics and Legal Regulation in the International Business
Environment: An FDI Case Study of Alstom, S.A., in Israel, 21 U. MIAMI BUS . L. REV. 1, 77
(2013) (“the objective of . . . more than a few ATS suits filed against MNEs is to reset the
context and terms of activism in opposition to” corporate behaviors).
212 Douglas M. Branson, Holding Multinational Corporations Accountable? Achilles’
Heels in Alien Tort Claims Act Litigation, 9 SANTA CLARA J. INT ’L L. 227, 249 (2011).
213 Id.
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The currency by which a corporation may satisfy the pressure
imposed against it could involve alterations in behavior, expenditures
on public relations campaigns, or contributions to funds or charities of
allegedly affected groups. It could take the form of outright monetary
payments, ceasing or altering operations to comply with demands or
private codes or protocols, enacting codes of conduct, joining compacts,
establishing corporate social responsibility departments, instituting
training, committing to transparency initiatives like contracting for
external audits, and other mechanisms that either alter behavior or
otherwise satisfy those interests applying some form of pressure to the
corporate operation.214

Those investing in ATS liability had succeeded in developing
a legal liability regime that frightened corporations.215
The threat of liability gave the corporate social responsibility
promoters of ATS liability an advantage, particularly for
pressuring corporations to settle to make an ATS suit go away or
take actions favorable to the advocacy group to avoid the filing of
a lawsuit in the first place.216 The mere acceptance of this
liability doctrine and its extension to cover corporate behavior
and snag corporations as defendants were alone enough to
immediately shift the balance in any negotiations between the
advocacy groups and corporations.217 Settling is sometimes just
about hedging risk, similar to a corporation’s financial decision to
buy insurance.218 The legal status of, and the weapons available
to, the corporate social responsibility activists were strengthened
while concomitantly the legal positions of the corporations were
weakened. When the law changes, so does the risk calculus,219

Kochan, Mechanization, supra note 27, at 256.
Childress, supra note 138, at 725 (plaintiffs can “create public-relations problems
for corporations, and thus force a settlement, because no corporation wishes to be known
as a human-rights abuser or violator of international law”); see also SHELL , supra note
141, at 101 (“A better way to understand leverage is to think about which side, at any
given moment, has the most to lose from a failure to agree.”); Adler & Silverstein, supra
note 87, at 20 (“[T]he essence of determining the relative power of the parties in a
negotiation depends less on how powerful each party is in any absolute sense than on how
badly each party needs or fears the other.”).
216 SHELL, supra note 141, at 104 (“Leverage is a complex mixture of ideas,” including
“opportunities that will be lost if the parties fail to reach a deal, threats to each party’s
status quo, and possible losses to each side’s self-esteem should their actions appear
inconsistent (in their own eyes) with a prior or professed standard of conduct or dealing.”).
217 See generally Dellinger, supra note 171 (describing strategies to stay out of court
under ATS by enacting preemptive corporate social responsibility measures).
218 J.B. Heaton, Settlement Pressure, 25 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 264, 272 (2005)
(“Corporations routinely buy insurance, and engage in a variety of more and less
sophisticated hedging activities.”).
219 Scheffer & Kaeb, supra note 209, at 372 (“The ATS presents a formidable
challenge in risk assessments because the liability that arises under ATS litigation,
whether or not the plaintiffs are successful, can be significant financially and otherwise.”).
214
215
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and so then does one’s willingness to give in to another party now
in a superior position.
Expansionist corporate social responsibility advocates clothe
their cause in a sense of pure motives and objectives, allowing
them to sell their cause to the sympathies of the public. It made
it difficult to run an opposition campaign with these optics. Thus,
corporations faced with ATS suits or the threat of such suits
sought to mute the campaign against them associated with an
ATS suit by negotiating away the case or possible filing of a
complaint. Preventative intervention is essential because some
damage could be done even just by filing an ATS suit.220
Risk-averse corporations showed a willingness to settle or
change behavior to avoid even the possibility of an ATS suit.
Negotiated agreements before suits were filed, settlements, and
other defensive tactics were designed to prevent, or at least
minimize, potential reputational and other damage to the
corporation.221 Corporations were motivated out of the fear of the
ATS and the changed position created by the alteration in legal
status accomplished by the creation of the ATS doctrine. When
the stakes are high for a defendant, settlement is often a
reasonable choice.222
The “unknowns” regarding how the courts would treat novel
theories of liability against corporations created risks that
further made settlement a reasonable option for defendants in
the early years of the developing doctrine holding corporations
liable under the ATS.223 Uncertainty itself motivates settlement.
The Supreme Court has recognized in a different but relatable
context that, when there is “uncertainty of the governing rules,
entities subject to secondary liability as aiders and abettors may
find it prudent and necessary, as a business judgment, to
abandon substantial defenses and to pay settlements in order to
avoid the expense and risk of going to trial.”224 The risks of
substantial litigation costs and the potential for long trials with

220 Dellinger, supra note 171, at 59 (“Even though cases regarding human rights
violations often result in settlement or dismissal, the tarnish to a corporation’s reputation
remains.”).
221 Id. at 74–75 (mere ever-present threat of ATS suits encourages companies to
change behavior to avoid litigation).
222 Posner, supra note 142, at 418–19 (explaining situations where the stakes impact
decisions to settle).
223 See generally id.; see also John P. Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J.
LEGAL STUD. 279, 280–81, 296 (1973) (examining “how individuals engaged in civil suits
will behave” and finding that “a critical component in the motivation of such individuals
to settle out of court is agreement on the probabilities of the court’s action”).
224 Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 189
(1994).

Do Not Delete

468

3/18/2014 8:16 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 17:2

extended discovery and lawyers’ fees made settlement attractive
for ATS defendants.225
Here again, discovery alone is a high risk for the corporation
and a huge gain for the plaintiffs. For example, in discovery there
is an ability to uncover information that, whether it establishes
liability or not, may not paint a very pretty picture of corporate
operations or at least the conditions in the areas where they
operate in developing countries.226 Guilt by operation in certain
regimes—a type of guilt by association—could be implied in the
eyes of the public that hears about an ATS suit against a
corporation and the atrocious allegations in the daily news for too
long. The literature on corporate behavior reveals that
corporations will go to great lengths to avoid damage to their
brand and reputation.227 Therefore, the potential damaging
impacts on a corporation’s reputation and brand from a lawsuit,
trial publicity, and plaintiffs’ promotion of their case in the press
often mitigates in favor of settling.228 Avoiding these damages to
reputation and brand may often be more valuable to a
corporation than avoidance of a large monetary judgment,
explaining why a corporation might settle even those cases that
it believes it can win on the merits.229 When a corporation faces
opposing forces that are threatening the corporate image or
reputation, it is not surprising that the corporation will be
reactive and work to quell the impact of the reputation-damaging

225 Posner, supra note 142, at 417 (“[S]ettlement costs are normally much lower than
litigation costs . . . .”).
226 Van Detta, supra note 211, at 76 (discussing “the considerable transactional costs
attendant to American-style discovery and civil practice, the generation of negative public
opinion and negative opinion among investors and analysts, and the costs of settlement—
which corporate ATS defendants have incurred in more than a few cases”).
227 Fairfax, supra note 140, at 805–06 (discussing the literature on the importance of
brand and reputation protection to corporations).
228 Kevin T. Jackson, Global Corporate Governance: Soft Law and Reputational
Accountability, 35 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 41, 47 (2010) (“[U]nlike traditional hard law
enforcement regimes, today’s emerging ‘civil regulations’ are grounded in the ‘rule of
reputation,’ which ties accountability solely to reputational capital, or lack thereof.
Operating internationally and faced with pressure to self-regulate, a company’s
reputation has become one of its most valuable assets.”); Stephens, supra note 132, at 14
(“Even absent payment of a judgment, the defendant may be ‘punished’ by public
exposure . . . .”); see also Peter T. Hoffman, Valuation of Cases for Settlement: Theory and
Practice, 1991 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 35 (1991) (“Settlement also can avoid the unwanted
publicity of a trial, a matter particularly important” when there are reputations to
maintain.); Jonathan C. Drimmer & Sarah R. Lamoree, Think Globally, Sue Locally:
Trends and Out-of-Court Tactics in Transnational Tort Actions, 29 BERKELEY J. INT ’L L.
456, 489–622 (2011) (using multiple case studies to show the effectiveness of out-of-court
tactics coordinated with and accompanying transnational tort litigation).
229 Scheffer & Kaeb, supra note 209, at 373 (“[R]eputational risks . . . can do far more
to damage corporate profitability and the long-term credibility of the ‘brand name’ than
most court cases could impose upon a corporate defendant.”).
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possibilities like the initiation of an ATS suit, let alone its filing
and progression to trial.230
When defendants are placed in untenable litigation positions
and the cost of defending against class actions is especially high,
for example, some have gone so far as to characterize the
plaintiff’s position to demand settlement as metaphorically akin
to a blackmailer.231 Moreover, the mere ability to threaten a class
action suit has been described by some scholars as creating a
situation of “legalized blackmail.”232 Whether class actions or not,
ATS suits create the same power dynamic as described in that
analysis.
In fact, Judge Dennis Jacobs from the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, when concurring in the denial of
rehearing in the Kiobel case that had held corporations could not
be liable under the ATS, explained that the holding halting
corporate ATS suits had the “considerable benefit of avoiding
abuse of the courts to extort settlements.”233 He discussed the
ATS corporate lawsuit as riddled with opportunities for
coercively induced settlements by corporations:
The holding of this case matters nevertheless because, without it,
plaintiffs would be able to plead . . . in a way that . . . would delay
dismissal of ATS suits against corporations; and the invasive
discovery that ensues could coerce settlements that have no relation to
the prospect of success on the ultimate merits. American discovery in
such cases uncovers corporate strategy and planning, diverts
resources and executive time, provokes bad public relations or
boycotts, threatens exposure of dubious trade practices, and risks
trade secrets. . . . These coercive pressures, combined with pressure to
remove contingent reserves from the corporate balance sheet, can

230 Fairfax, supra note 140, at 806–07; Priest & Klein, supra note 143, at 24; Mulreed,
supra note 143, at 781 n.2.
231 See, e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298–1300 (7th Cir. 1995)
(Posner, J.) (citing HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 120
(1973) (citing Handler while discussing the dynamics in class action cases and the high
likelihood that they “produce blackmail settlements”)); Milton Handler, The Shift from
Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits—The Twenty-Third Annual
Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9 (1971) (“Any device which is workable only
because it utilizes the threat of unmanageable and expensive litigation to compel
settlement is not a rule of procedure—it is a form of legalized blackmail.”). See also
Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”: Class Certification and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1357, 1386 (2003) (“It seems safe to conclude that proponents are using the word
‘blackmail’ metaphorically.”).
232 See, e.g., In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Products Liability
Litigation, 55 F.3d 768, 784–85 (3d Cir. 1995) (“Another problem is that class actions
create the opportunity for a kind of legalized blackmail: a greedy and unscrupulous
plaintiff might use the threat of a large class action, which can be costly to the defendant,
to extract a settlement far in excess of the individual claims’ actual worth.”).
233 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 642 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2011) (Jacobs,
C.J., concurring in denial of rehearing).
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easily coerce the payment of tens of millions of dollars in settlement,
even where a plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits is zero.
Courts should take care that they do not become instruments of abuse
and extortion. 234

This extortion-like threat was facilitated by an all-out strategy to
use both the in-court threat of ATS liability and out-of-court
tactics touting the claimed ATS liability as a means to pressure
corporations.235
Indeed, what is particularly important with the evolution of
the ATS cases against corporations is the power that came from
the mere recognition by the courts of the legitimacy of these
lawsuits.236 Once courts started denying motions to dismiss
against corporate ATS defendants, the settlement dynamic
changed dramatically. Research shows that plaintiffs’ ability to
survive a motion to dismiss substantially alters corporations’ and
other defendants’ risk assessments regarding non-settlement
options (such as going to trial).237 The chance of settlement is
much higher when plaintiff’s case can withstand a motion to
dismiss because it is usually the cheaper and less risky
alternative.238 It is for this reason that the development of the
liability regime under the ATS—including the cases that
ultimately used early ATS case precedent to build toward the
creation of the corporate liability layer of ATS doctrine—became
so important and such a powerful rent-seeking achievement.
For a long time, the threat of ATS liability had a substantial
impact on leverage. The power dynamic between corporations
and corporate social responsibility advocates substantially
changed as a result of the liability regime that was emerging and
threatening to emerge. As all of these corporate ATS lawsuits
began to pick up steam, debate grew regarding the
appropriateness of using U.S. courts to extraterritorially enforce

Id.
Drimmer, supra note 210, at 999 (“[O]ut-of-court tactics, in conjunction with
litigation, have taken hold. Plaintiffs, their attorneys, and their representatives regularly
utilize these strategies to pressure corporate defendants to settle cases or change existing
practices, publicize their causes, and for other purposes” (emphasis added)); Drimmer &
Lamoree, supra note 228, at 472–88 (explaining how in connection with ATS and other
“transnational tort cases, parties frequently employ [a variety of] out-of-court tactics in
part to publicly advance their cause, pressure their opponents, or initiate corporate
change” including media, investment, political, and community organizing tactics).
236 See generally Adler & Silverstein, supra note 87, at 6 (exploring “the concept of
power disparities in negotiation”).
237 Sale, supra note 144, at 386 (2011) (showing the relationship between
survivability of motions to dismiss and defendants motivations to settle to avoid damages
and reputational harm).
238 Id.; see also Pritchard, supra note 145, at 952–53 (1999) (stating that if plaintiffs
can survive a motion to dismiss, defendants will often settle to minimize further harm).
234
235
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supposed internationally accepted norms and impose liability for
violations of such norms by foreign actors and for actions outside
the United States that were otherwise subject to foreign laws and
regulations.
The Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. case reached the
U.S. Supreme Court after the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held that corporations were not proper defendants
under the ATS.239 The Second Circuit’s decision split with several
other circuits that had decided ATS suits against corporations
could proceed.240 Although not deciding when, if ever,
corporations are proper defendants under the ATS, the 2013
Supreme Court decision in Kiobel severely limited ATS suits,
including those against corporations, by interpreting the ATS as
having no (or some say almost no) extraterritorial reach.241
Because almost all of the available corporate social responsibility
stories for ATS cases involved corporate actions outside the
United States, the ATS as a corporate social responsibility tool
against anyone, including multi-national corporations, was
effectively neutralized by Kiobel.242
If there was any doubt about the ATS as a rent-seeking
interest group strategy, one need only look at the press releases
immediately following Kiobel by many of the activist groups
lamenting that the Court “shut their doors” to their causes and
the fact that the Court “harshly limited” usage of the ATS.243 The
239 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 621 F.3d 111, 147–48 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding
that corporations are not subjects of international law and therefore law of nations does
not recognize corporate liability).
240 See, e.g., Doe v. Exxon Mobile Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2011), vacated by
Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 09-7125, 2013 WL 3970103 (D.C. Cir. July 26, 2013); Flomo
v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1025 (7th Cir. 2011); Sarei v. Rio Tinto,
PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 818 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. granted and judgment vacated by
Rio Tinto PLC v. Sarei, 133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013); Romero v. Drummond Co., Inc., 552 F.3d
1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008).
241 See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (“We therefore conclude that the presumption
against extraterritoriality applies to claims under the ATS, and that nothing in the
statute rebuts that presumption.”). See also, e.g., Michael D. Goldhaber, The Global
Lawyer: The Zombification of the Corporate Alien Tort, THE LITIGATION DAILY, Apr. 21,
2013, http://www.americanlawyer.com/digestTAL.jsp?id=1202596949949 (“Rather than
kill the corporate alien tort outright, the Court maimed all forms of alien tort by
restricting their territorial reach. The corporate alien tort is therefore doomed to remain a
zombie doctrine—not quite alive and not quite dead.”).
242 Rich Samp, Supreme Court Observations: Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum & the
Future of Alien Tort Litigation, FORBES , Apr. 18, 2013, http://www.forbes.com/sites/
wlf/2013/04/18/supreme-court-observations-kiobel-v-royal-dutch-petroleum-the-future-ofalien-tort-litigation/ (“Yesterday’s decision . . . will lead to the dismissal of virtually all
pending ATS cases.”).
243 See, e.g., Kiobel v. Shell: Supreme Court Limits Courts’ Ability to Hear Claims of
Human Rights Abuses Committed Abroad, CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (Apr. 17,
2013), http://ccrjustice.org/newsroom/press-releases/kiobel-v.-shell%3A-supreme-court-lim
its-courts%E2%80%99-ability-hear-claims-of-human-rights-abuses-committed-a (quoting
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complaints in the press releases sounded like investors who had
seen their portfolio (represented by the package of ATS
precedents purchased) disappear, holding stocks they could not
sell (represented by the fact that the courts were now closed to
almost all claims where those precedents could have been
valuable), suffering from a metaphorical stock market crash
(represented by the devaluation of those precedents as a
consequence of the Kiobel holding). These groups tried to find a
silver lining in the decision and held out hope for some suits
against corporations surviving,244 but realistically there is very
little room left in the now-limited ATS for its use as a corporate
social responsibility tool. Some groups admitted that they would
need to redirect their investments now that the ATS remedy was
cut off. For example, one corporate social responsibility group
named the Accountability Counsel informed its members in a
post-Kiobel press release that “[f]or victims of corporate abuse

lead counsel for the Kiobel plaintiffs (who has also been counsel in many ATS cases) as
stating, “We are disappointed by today’s ruling and the fact that U.S. courts have shut
their doors to the human rights violations our clients suffered”); Natalie B. Fields, What
Kiobel Means for Corporate Accountability, ACCOUNTABILITY COUNSEL (Apr. 17, 2013),
http://www.accountabilitycounsel.org/news/what-kiobel-means-to-corporate-accountab
ility/ (“Today, the U.S. Supreme Court harshly limited cases that may be brought in U.S.
courts against corporations that commit human rights abuses abroad.”); Kiobel Ruling
Undermines U.S. Leadership on Human Rights, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST (Apr. 17, 2013),
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/2013/04/17/kiobel-ruling-undermines-u-s-leadership-onhuman-rights/ (“Today in its decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, the Supreme
Court gutted the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), a law that has been on the books for more than
200 years and for the last 30 years has been a critical avenue to hold serious human
rights violators accountable.”); Kate Mitchell, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum and the
Future of Corporate Accountability for Human Rights Violations Committed Abroad,
OXFORD HUMAN RIGHTS HUB (Apr. 21, 2013), http://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/?p=1579 (“The
Court held that the Alien Torts Statute (ATS) did not apply extraterritorially, shutting off
an avenue previously embraced by human rights advocates for making corporations
accountable for human rights abuses committed abroad.”); Civil and Human Rights
Coalition Criticizes Supreme Court Ruling in Kiobel as a Setback for Human Rights, THE
LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE (Apr. 17, 2013), http://www.civilrights.org/press/2013/kiobelsupreme-court.html (“Today’s decision in Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum undermines the
unique and important role of U.S. courts in providing an opportunity for justice for those
who have suffered serious human rights violations at the hands of repressive regimes
around the world. With this decision, the Supreme Court has closed our courthouse doors
. . . .”).
244 See, e.g., Alison Frankel, Human Rights Lawyers Look for Silver Lining in Kiobel
Black Cloud, REUTERS BLOG (Apr. 17, 2013, 10:09 PM), http://blogs.reuters.com/alisonfrankel/2013/04/17/human-rights-lawyers-look-for-silver-lining-in-kiobel-black-cloud/
(“When the U.S. Chamber of Commerce rushes out a statement hailing a decision by the
U.S. Supreme Court, you can be sure that opinion is a defeat for plaintiffs’ lawyers.”);
Wessen Jazrawi, Kiobel v Shell: US Supreme Court on corporate accountability for foreign
human
rights
abuses,
UK
HUMAN
RIGHTS
BLOG
(Apr.
18,
2013),
http://ukhumanrightsblog.com/2013/04/18/kiobel-v-shell-us-supreme-court-on-corporateaccountability-for-foreign-human-rights-abuses/ (“[W]hilst Kiobel has been a setback for
those seeking stronger accountability of multinationals operating abroad, the decision
does not mean that corporations are immune from liability, and ways will continue to be
sought to that end.”).
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that had hoped to use U.S. courts, and now cannot, our work [on
non-judicial accountability mechanisms] just became that much
more important.”245 Several of these groups in their statements
specifically discussed Kiobel as a blow to corporate accountability
and social responsibility campaigns.246 A critical weapon in the
expansionist corporate social responsibility activists’ arsenal was
lost.247 Of course, all sides had an opinion.248 Immediately
following the decision, business-aligned interest groups also had
their own press releases applauding the Kiobel decision in large
part due to the relief it provided for the corporation’s legal
positioning.249

Fields, supra note 243.
See, e.g., Marjorie Jobson, South Africa: Unanswered Questions For The South
Africa Apartheid Litigation As U.S. Supreme Court April 17 Rules Against The Kiobel
Case, KHULAMANI SUPPORT GROUP (Apr. 24, 2013), http://www.khulumani.net/
khulumani/statements/item/780-unanswered-questions-for-the-south-africa-apartheid-liti
gation-as-us-supreme-court-april-17-rules-against-the-kiobel-case.html?utm_source=Khul
umani+News+Alerts&utm_campaign=2ea075167c-Kiobel_case_statement4_24_2013&ut
m_medium=email (“The Kiobel decision seems to have ‘cut a hole into the web of
accountability . . . .,’ said Elisa Massimino, President of Human Rights First.”); US:
Supreme Court Limits Suits Against Rights Abusers Abroad, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Apr.
29, 2013), http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/04/29/us-supreme-court-limits-suits-againstrights-abusers-abroad (“[Kiobel] undercuts case law that had made the US courts a
mainstay for redress for victims of serious human rights abuses.”); Analysis: Set-Back for
Corporate Accountability on Human Rights, THE DANISH INSTITUTE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
(Apr. 23, 2013), http://humanrights.dk/news/news?doc=22277 (“Last week, events in the
US made it harder to hold multinational companies accountable for contributing to
human rights abuses in their global operations . . . . For the past two decades, the ATS
has been one of the most visible manifestations of the global need for greater clarity on
the human rights responsibility of corporate actors.”).
247 Jobson, supra note 246. Jobson concludes that “this power to advance corporate
accountability has been significantly reduced by the US Supreme Court’s decision.” Id.
She quotes Rita Kesselring, a Swiss scholar who wrote that, “[i]n an environment in
which few institutions, whether judicial or political, have been able to secure the
accountability and liability of corporations, the ATS has served a unique and critical
function. It has had the power to enforce liability for compromising the dignity of human
beings and (it) has strengthened international human rights against corporate abuse.”
Id.
248 Marcia Coyle, Justice Limit Reach of Alien Tort Law, AM. LAWYER, Apr. 17, 2013,
available at http://www.americanlawyer.com/PubArticleTAL.jsp?id=1202596443758&
Justices_Limit_Reach_of_Alien_Tort_Law (describing the reactions from both sides to the
Kiobel decision).
249 See, e.g., U.S. Chamber Commends Supreme Court for Reining In Abuses of Alien
Tort Statute, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (Apr. 17, 2013), http://www.uschamber.com/
press/releases/2013/april/us-chamber-commends-supreme-court-reining-abuses-alien-tortstatute (“U.S. Chamber of Commerce today praised [the Kiobel] decision . . . that limits
the global business community’s liability under the [ATS]” calling the ATS cases “a
scheme by class action trial lawyers” to “expose global businesses to frivolous and costly
lawsuits”); Peter Nestor, The Supreme Court Has Ruled on Kiobel. Now What?, THE
BUSINESS OF A BETTER WORLD (Apr. 17, 2013), http://www.bsr.org/en/our-insights/blogview/the-supreme-court-has-ruled-on-kiobel.-now-what (“Our initial assessment after
today’s opinion is that most businesses will not likely face suit in U.S. federal court under
this ruling, particularly for allegations of abuse occurring abroad.”).
245
246
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As a result of Kiobel and the closing of the ATS
mechanization to achieve corporate social responsibility
objectives, we should see the expansionist interest groups
channel their resources to other avenues. There should be a
post-Kiobel shift in their investment strategy, perhaps away from
law creation or just to other law-production centers. We have
seen this shift in part with the rise of state-based tort claims
seeking remedies for supposed corporate harms and state-based
causes of action with extra-territorial reach, including and
sometimes beyond what these groups attempted to push through
the mechanism of the ATS.250 It would be interesting in future
work to research where these corporate social responsibility
groups divert the funds previously dedicated to their ATS
litigation budgets.
Despite the convincing proof of its demise through Kiobel,
the story of the ATS’s life tells an interesting tale about interest
group behavior and corporate social responsibility activism. The
ATS evolution is instructive about the means and institutional
venues for rent-seeking behavior and the real possible returns
from investing in the creation of law (including liability
doctrines) beneficial to one’s self-interest.
CONCLUSION
Public choice, interest group theory, and the economic
analysis of law provide methods by which we can better
understand the operational aspects of corporate social
responsibility advocacy. Like any interest groups, those groups
labeling as their mission the advancement of new social
responsibilities for corporations will engage in the same
cost/benefit analysis as any other interest groups determining
where to invest their limited time, money, and other resources.
When rent-seeking for legal change is the more efficient use of
their limited resources, corporate social responsibility groups will
invest in the creation of law to advance their own interests at the
expense of others. This Article sought to explain these
motivations and position corporate social responsibility activism
in the same category of skepticism due any interest-group
investment in the creation of laws.

250 See generally Childress III, supra note 138; Ziad Haider, Corporate Liability for
Human Rights Abuses: Analyzing Kiobel and Alternatives to the Alien Tort Statute, 43
GEO. J. INT’L L. 1361 (2012); Roger Alford, Kiobel Insta-Symposium: The Death of the ATS
and the Rise of Transnational Tort Litigation, OPINIO JURIS (Apr. 17, 2013, 5:48 PM),
http://opiniojuris.org/2013/04/17/kiobel-instthe-death-of-the-ats-and-the-rise-of-transnatio
nal-tort-litigation/.
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Finally, both generally and through the case study of the
ATS, this Article sought to demonstrate that rent-seeking
analysis should have broad application. There is room for
increased scrutiny of new rules of liability emerging from the
courts that, in all likelihood, have sometimes themselves been
the product of interest group investment in the creation of new
judicial doctrine. There are lessons to be learned about
precedent-building litigation development strategies employed in
public law litigation and elsewhere. Moreover, these insights
help expand the utility of public choice analysis, and more
aggressive use of this mode of analyzing litigation outcomes for
rent-seeking origins could provide further valuable insights on
how tort laws and other judicially-created legal doctrines come
about and whether their content should receive more critical
examination as a result of the background processes of their
creation.
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